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Introduction	  
	   What	  does	  justice	  require?	  Is	  it	  equality	  -­‐	  the	  ability	  to	  pursue	  your	  life	  goals	  on	  an	  equal	  footing	  with	  your	  fellow	  citizens,	  to	  live	  as	  a	  respected	  and	  valued	  member	  of	  your	  collective	  society?	  Is	  it	  freedom	  -­‐	  the	  ability	  to	  live	  your	  life	  autonomously,	  free	  from	  the	  interference	  of	  other	  citizens	  and	  the	  state?	  Or	  is	  it	  some	  combination	  of	  the	  two	  -­‐	  a	  shared	  respect	  for	  the	  equal	  status	  of	  citizens	  and	  their	  autonomously	  chosen	  life	  plans?	  Deliberations	  about	  these	  questions	  have	  led	  to	  myriad	  philosophical	  schools	  of	  thought,	  each	  one	  advocating	  for	  its	  own	  unique	  conception	  of	  justice.	  	  One	  philosophical	  tradition	  that	  has	  arisen	  out	  of	  this	  debate	  is	  high	  liberalism.	  Championed	  by	  distinguished	  philosopher,	  John	  Rawls,	  high	  liberals	  argue	  in	  favor	  of	  a	  conception	  of	  justice	  as	  fairness.	  On	  this	  view,	  individuals	  are	  conceptualized	  as	  free	  and	  equal	  democratic	  citizens,	  endowed	  with	  the	  moral	  powers	  of	  reasonableness	  and	  rationality,	  which	  enable	  them	  to	  pursue	  their	  life	  goals	  while	  simultaneously	  respecting	  the	  needs	  of	  other	  citizens	  to	  do	  the	  same.1	  Against	  this	  backdrop,	  Rawls	  assumes	  that	  what	  a	  just	  society	  requires	  is	  that	  people	  be	  free	  to	  develop	  their	  reasonable	  and	  rational	  capacities	  without	  arbitrary	  differences	  in	  social	  position	  and	  natural	  talents	  unfairly	  favoring	  some	  citizens	  over	  others.	  For	  this	  reason,	  Rawls	  proposes	  two	  principles	  of	  justice	  to	  guide	  the	  formulation	  of	  the	  basic	  political,	  social	  and	  economic	  institutions	  of	  society.	  These	  principles	  are:	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  See	  p.8	  for	  expanded	  explanation	  of	  these	  terms.	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1.Each	  person	  has	  the	  same	  indefeasible	  claim	  to	  a	  fully	  adequate	  scheme	  of	  equal	  basic	  liberties,	  which	  scheme	  is	  compatible	  with	  the	  same	  scheme	  of	  liberties	  for	  all;	  and	  	  2.Social	  and	  economic	  inequalities	  are	  to	  satisfy	  two	  conditions:	  first,	  they	  are	  to	  be	  attached	  to	  offices	  and	  positions	  open	  to	  all	  under	  conditions	  of	  fair	  equality	  of	  opportunity;	  and	  second,	  they	  are	  to	  be	  to	  the	  greatest	  benefit	  of	  the	  least-­‐advantaged	  members	  of	  society	  (the	  difference	  principle).	  2	  	  In	  applying	  these	  principles,	  Rawls	  advocates	  for	  government	  intervention	  in	  the	  economy	  so	  as	  to	  guarantee	  that	  all	  citizens,	  regardless	  of	  their	  class	  or	  natural	  abilities,	  are	  able	  to	  grow	  as	  reasonable	  and	  rational	  citizens	  through	  systems	  of	  publicly	  funded	  education,	  and	  careers	  open	  to	  all.	  An	  additional	  characteristic	  of	  Rawls’	  view	  is	  that	  it	  affirms	  only	  a	  limited	  set	  of	  economic	  liberties	  as	  essential	  for	  the	  development	  of	  citizens’	  moral	  powers.	  For	  Rawls	  and	  his	  many	  supporters,	  the	  only	  economic	  liberty	  that	  democratic	  citizens	  need	  in	  order	  to	  live	  full	  and	  meaningful	  lives	  is	  	  “the	  right	  to	  hold	  and	  to	  have	  exclusive	  use	  of	  personal	  property.”3	  More	  extensive	  economic	  liberties	  including,	  "certain	  rights	  of	  acquisition	  and	  bequest,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  right	  to	  own	  means	  of	  production	  and	  natural	  resources"	  and	  “the	  right	  to	  property	  as	  including	  the	  equal	  right	  to	  participate	  in	  the	  control	  of	  the	  means	  of	  productions	  and	  of	  natural	  resources,	  both	  of	  which	  are	  to	  be	  socially,	  not	  privately	  owned”	  are	  not	  deemed	  basic	  because	  they	  are	  not,	  on	  Rawls’	  account,	  needed	  for	  all	  citizens	  to	  fully	  develop	  and	  exercise	  their	  moral	  powers.	  4	  In	  stark	  contrast	  to	  the	  high	  liberal	  conception	  of	  justice	  are	  the	  libertarian	  and	  classical	  liberal	  conceptions.	  These	  philosophical	  schools	  argue	  that	  justice	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  2	  Rawls,	  John.	  JAF,	  p.42.	  3	  Rawls,	  JAF,	  p.114.	  4	  Rawls,	  JAF,	  p.114.	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requires	  that	  the	  basic	  structure	  of	  society	  focus	  on	  protecting	  individuals’	  autonomy	  rather	  than	  worrying	  about	  concerns	  of	  equality.	  Libertarians	  and	  classical	  liberals,	  in	  conceptualizing	  individuals	  as	  self-­‐owners	  and	  utility	  seekers	  (respectively),	  hope	  to	  maximize	  the	  freedoms	  of	  citizens	  so	  that	  each	  person	  may	  seek	  their	  own	  ends	  in	  their	  own	  way.5	  Following	  from	  their	  strong	  commitment	  to	  individual	  freedom,	  both	  libertarians	  and	  classical	  liberals	  advocate	  for	  the	  basic	  structure	  of	  society	  to	  be	  more	  capitalistic	  and	  require	  a	  more	  extensive	  set	  of	  economic	  liberties,	  including	  the	  right	  to	  own	  a	  business	  and	  negotiate	  one’s	  terms	  of	  employment.	  This	  is	  because	  on	  their	  account,	  these	  liberties	  represent	  “essential	  parts	  of	  freedom.”6	  	  	   The	  divide	  between	  high	  liberals	  and	  libertarians/classical	  liberals,	  is	  standardly	  thought	  to	  be	  an	  unbridgeable	  one.	  	  However,	  in	  his	  recent	  book,	  Free	  Market	  Fairness,	  John	  Tomasi	  proposes	  an	  innovative	  middle	  ground	  solution	  to	  the	  question	  of	  what	  justice	  requires.	  Rather	  than	  seeing	  thick	  economic	  rights	  and	  social	  justice	  as	  competing	  values,	  Tomasi	  argues	  that	  with	  his	  market-­‐democratic	  interpretation	  of	  Rawls’	  theory	  of	  justice	  as	  fairness,	  economic	  liberties	  and	  social	  justice,	  free	  markets	  and	  fairness,	  can	  be	  united.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  5	  The	  idea	  of	  self-­‐ownership	  is	  thought	  to	  have	  originated	  with	  John	  Locke	  who	  wrote:	  “Every	  Man	  has	  a	  Property	  in	  his	  own	  Person.	  This	  no	  Body	  has	  any	  Right	  to	  but	  himself.	  The	  Labour	  of	  his	  Body,	  and	  the	  Work	  of	  his	  Hands,	  we	  may	  say,	  are	  properly	  his.	  Whatsoever	  then	  he	  removes	  out	  of	  the	  State	  that	  Nature	  hath	  provided,	  and	  left	  it	  in,	  he	  hath	  mixed	  his	  Labour	  with,	  and	  joyned	  to	  it	  something	  that	  is	  his	  own,	  and	  thereby	  makes	  it	  his	  Property.	  (Locke,	  John,	  and	  C.	  B.	  Macpherson.	  Second	  Treatise	  of	  Government.	  Indianapolis,	  IN:	  Hackett	  Pub.,	  1980.	  Print.	  p.19).	  Libertarians	  believe	  that	  protecting	  self-­‐ownership	  is	  a	  core	  interest	  of	  individuals.	  In	  contrast,	  the	  idea	  of	  individuals	  as	  utility	  seekers,	  introduced	  by	  Jeremy	  Bentham,	  argues	  that	  what	  individuals	  desire	  most	  (and	  what	  societies	  should	  therefore	  aim	  to	  secure)	  is	  maximization	  of	  happiness.	  (Bentham,	  Jeremy.	  An	  Introduction	  to	  the	  Principles	  of	  Morals	  and	  Legislation	  (Dover	  Philosophical	  Classics).	  Dover	  Publications	  Inc.	  p.	  1January	  2009.)	  Classical	  liberals	  argue	  for	  a	  tight	  connection	  between	  utility	  maximization	  and	  freedom.	  6	  Tomasi,	  FMF,	  p.	  xi.	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   Tomasi’s	  hybrid	  view	  mimics	  the	  capitalist	  call	  for	  a	  more	  substantive	  set	  of	  basic	  economic	  liberties.	  However,	  unlike	  libertarianism	  or	  classical	  liberalism,	  it	  seeks	  to	  justify	  these	  liberties	  in	  the	  same	  way	  that	  Rawls	  justifies	  his	  own	  list	  of	  basic	  liberties.	  Namely,	  Tomasi	  argues	  that	  the	  economic	  liberties	  are	  basic	  because	  they	  are	  essential	  for	  the	  development	  of	  the	  moral	  powers	  of	  citizens.	  	  	   In	  addition	  to	  changing	  Rawls’	  first	  principle	  of	  justice	  to	  include	  the	  economic	  liberties	  in	  Rawls’	  list	  of	  other	  basic	  liberties,	  Tomasi	  proposes	  a	  second	  significant	  alteration	  to	  Rawls’	  theoretical	  framework.	  Specifically,	  he	  proposes	  making	  Rawls’	  second	  principle	  of	  justice	  put	  substantially	  more	  emphasis	  on	  maximizing	  citizens’	  holdings	  of	  income	  and	  wealth.	  Tomasi	  argues	  that	  this	  change	  will	  allow	  individuals	  to	  more	  effectively	  pursue	  their	  own	  life	  plans	  by	  allowing	  them	  to	  put	  their	  increased	  shares	  of	  income	  and	  wealth	  towards	  whatever	  goals	  or	  aims	  are	  most	  important	  to	  them.	  In	  the	  course	  of	  this	  thesis	  I	  will	  work	  to	  evaluate	  Tomasi’s	  claims	  that	  his	  market	  democratic	  interpretation	  of	  justice	  as	  fairness	  offers	  the	  type	  of	  valuable	  changes	  that	  he	  suggests	  it	  does.	  In	  my	  first	  chapter	  I	  will	  flesh	  out	  the	  essential	  details	  of	  Rawls’	  view,	  which	  define	  both	  the	  scope	  and	  limitations	  of	  justice	  as	  fairness.	  In	  my	  second	  chapter	  I	  will	  then	  introduce	  Tomasi’s	  hybrid	  alternative	  to	  show	  precisely	  how	  his	  theory	  purports	  to	  marry	  the	  libertarian/classical	  liberal	  value	  of	  free	  markets	  to	  the	  high	  liberal	  value	  of	  fairness.	  Chapter	  3	  will	  focus	  on	  the	  content	  changes	  that	  Tomasi	  makes	  to	  Rawls’	  first	  principle	  of	  justice.	  Here	  I	  will	  argue	  that	  Tomasi’s	  economic	  liberties	  should	  not,	  as	  Tomasi	  suggests,	  be	  deemed	  basic;	  since,	  they	  do	  not	  meet	  the	  same	  standard	  of	  significance	  as	  do	  Rawls’	  other	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basic	  liberties.	  In	  chapter	  4,	  I	  will	  raise	  two	  additional	  problems	  with	  Tomasi’s	  view,	  both	  relating	  to	  Rawls’	  second	  principle	  of	  justice.	  The	  first	  is	  a	  problem	  that	  arises	  from	  Tomasi’s	  recommendation	  that	  citizens	  prioritize	  the	  economic	  liberties	  over	  the	  second	  principle	  of	  justice.	  The	  second	  problem	  critiques	  Tomasi’s	  decision	  to	  emphasize	  the	  value	  of	  income	  and	  wealth	  over	  other	  values	  that	  are	  equally,	  if	  not	  more,	  important	  to	  the	  development	  of	  democratic	  citizens’	  moral	  powers.	  I	  will	  conclude	  by	  arguing	  that,	  overall,	  Rawls’	  original	  theory	  is	  preferable	  to	  Tomasi’s	  market	  democratic	  interpretation,	  even	  though	  certain	  nuances	  of	  Tomasi’s	  theory	  are	  valuable	  in	  their	  own	  right.	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Chapter	  1.	  
Rawls’	  Theory	  of	  Justice	  	  “Justice	  is	  the	  first	  virtue	  of	  social	  institutions,	  as	  truth	  is	  of	  systems	  of	  thought.	  A	  theory	  however	  elegant	  and	  economical	  must	  be	  rejected	  or	  revised	  if	  it	  is	  untrue;	  likewise	  laws	  and	  institutions	  no	  matter	  how	  efficient	  and	  well-­‐arranged	  must	  be	  reformed	  or	  abolished	  if	  they	  are	  unjust.”	  	   ―	  John	  Rawls,	  A	  Theory	  of	  Justice	  
	  
1.	  A	  Theory	  of	  Justice:	  Defining	  the	  Democratic	  Citizen	  In	  1971	  John	  Rawls	  published	  his	  seminal	  work,	  A	  Theory	  of	  Justice,	  one	  of	  the	  most	  influential	  accounts	  of	  liberal	  political	  philosophy	  ever	  written.	  In	  this	  work,	  Rawls	  outlines	  his	  theory	  of	  justice	  as	  fairness,	  which	  sets	  out	  to	  determine	  and	  support	  a	  set	  of	  principles	  of	  social	  justice.	  Fundamentally,	  this	  theory	  follows	  from	  the	  assumption	  of	  a	  democratic	  society	  conceptualized	  as	  a	  fair	  system	  of	  cooperation	  between	  free	  and	  equal	  citizens.	  As	  an	  essential	  component	  of	  this	  theory,	  Rawls	  ascribes	  to	  democratic	  citizens	  two	  essential	  powers	  of	  moral	  personality:	  reasonableness	  and	  rationality.7	  Reasonableness	  in	  this	  Rawlsian	  context	  refers	  to	  having	  a	  “sense	  of	  justice”	  (i.e.	  a	  disposition	  to	  act	  fairly	  towards	  others)	  while	  rationality	  refers	  to	  having	  “a	  capacity	  for	  a	  conception	  of	  the	  good”	  understood	  as	  the	  ability	  to	  select,	  revise	  and	  pursue	  over	  time	  an	  autonomously	  chosen	  plan	  of	  life.8	  	  What	  makes	  these	  powers	  so	  constitutive	  of	  a	  democratic	  citizen	  is	  that	  they	  are	  both	  essential	  for	  generating	  a	  system	  of	  fair	  cooperation.	  Rationality	  provides	  meaning	  and	  motivation	  for	  cooperation:	  it	  is	  our	  ability	  to	  select,	  revise	  and	  pursue	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  7	  Arnold,	  Samuel.	  "Putting	  Liberty	  in	  Its	  Place:	  High	  Liberalism	  Without	  the	  	  Liberalism."	  Putting	  Liberty	  in	  Its	  Place:	  High	  Liberalism	  Without	  the	  Liberalism.	  Academia.edu,	  n.d.	  p.2.Web.	  20	  Oct.	  2015.	  	  8	  Freeman,	  Samuel,	  "Original	  position",	  The	  Stanford	  Encyclopedia	  of	  Philosophy	  (Fall	  2014	  Edition),	  Edward	  N.	  Zalta	  (ed.),	  URL	  =	  <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2014/entries/original-­‐position/>.	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the	  things	  that	  matter	  to	  us	  that	  incentivizes	  us	  to	  cooperate	  with	  others	  in	  order	  to	  reach	  our	  goals	  and	  pursue	  our	  many	  conceptions	  of	  the	  good.	  Likewise,	  reasonableness	  is	  an	  essential	  attribute	  of	  democratic	  citizens	  because	  it	  guarantees	  that	  citizens	  will	  follow	  the	  rules	  that	  we,	  living	  in	  cooperation	  with	  one	  another,	  “accept	  and	  regard	  as	  properly	  regulating	  [our]	  conduct.”9	  In	  simpler	  terms,	  rationality	  can	  be	  thought	  of	  as	  ensuring	  the	  cooperative	  component	  of	  fair	  cooperation,	  while	  reasonableness	  ensures	  the	  fairness	  component.	  It	  follows	  from	  this	  conception	  of	  a	  democratic	  citizen	  that	  a	  just	  and	  fair	  society	  will	  arrange	  its	  institutions	  in	  such	  a	  way	  as	  to	  respect	  each	  citizen	  as	  a	  moral,	  self-­‐governing	  agent	  engaged	  in	  a	  cooperative	  venture	  with	  other,	  equally	  worthy,	  moral	  agents.10	  So,	  for	  a	  society	  to	  be	  just	  it	  must	  allow	  these	  two	  moral	  powers	  of	  reasonableness	  and	  rationality	  to	  flourish.	  Moreover,	  because	  democratic	  citizens	  are	  necessarily	  presumed	  to	  be	  free	  and	  equal,	  societal	  institutions	  must	  not	  discriminate	  between	  people	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  their	  race,	  gender,	  religion,	  class	  of	  origin,	  or	  their	  own	  particular	  conception	  of	  the	  good	  life,	  for	  this	  would	  bias	  the	  scales	  of	  justice	  unfairly.	  
2.	  The	  Original	  Position	  and	  The	  Veil	  of	  Ignorance	  	   To	  determine	  precisely	  which	  institutions	  a	  society	  would	  need	  in	  order	  to	  create	  this	  fair	  and	  just	  outcome	  is	  a	  challenging	  task.	  For,	  in	  addition	  to	  democratic	  citizens	  possessing	  the	  two	  moral	  powers	  of	  rationality	  and	  reasonableness,	  they	  also	  possess	  their	  own	  lifestyles	  that	  may	  not	  be	  compatible	  with	  the	  lifestyles	  of	  others.	  For	  example,	  a	  single	  mother	  from	  Jefferson	  County,	  Mississippi	  may	  not	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  9	  Arnold,	  PL,	  p.6.	  10	  Arnold,	  PL,	  p.6.	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view	  the	  same	  societal	  institutions	  as	  fair	  as	  may	  a	  wealthy	  stockbroker	  from	  the	  Upper	  East	  Side	  of	  Manhattan.	  As	  a	  solution	  to	  this	  problem,	  Rawls	  introduces	  a	  thought	  experiment	  known	  as	  the	  original	  position,	  which	  seeks	  to	  pick	  out	  the	  principles	  of	  cooperation	  that	  free	  and	  equal	  citizens	  would	  agree	  to	  under	  fair	  conditions,	  removed	  from	  their	  own	  biased	  notions	  of	  the	  good	  life.	  This	  thought	  experiment	  aims	  to	  secure	  the	  three	  fundamental	  interests	  of	  democratic	  citizens:	  1)	  pursuing	  a	  particular	  rational	  plan	  of	  life,	  2)	  exercising	  and	  developing	  the	  moral	  power	  of	  reasonableness	  and	  3)	  exercising	  and	  developing	  the	  moral	  power	  of	  rationality.11	  	   Under	  this	  hypothetical	  situation,	  individuals	  are	  asked	  to	  consider	  what	  principles	  are	  required	  of	  social	  justice	  in	  the	  abstract,	  rather	  than	  worrying	  over	  which	  principles	  would	  best	  fit	  their	  own	  particular	  ends.	  To	  aid	  in	  this	  effort,	  Rawls	  imposes	  a	  veil	  of	  ignorance	  on	  all	  parties	  involved,	  thus	  ensuring	  that	  each	  citizen	  can	  make	  their	  determination	  about	  what	  is	  fair	  without	  the	  influence	  of	  arbitrary	  factors	  affecting	  their	  decision.	  Behind	  this	  veil	  of	  ignorance,	  no	  one	  has	  any	  knowledge	  of	  his	  or	  her	  race,	  ethnicity,	  class,	  gender,	  age	  etc.	  Resultantly,	  the	  aforementioned	  New	  York	  stockbroker,	  while	  under	  the	  veil	  of	  ignorance,	  would	  refrain	  from	  claiming	  that	  huge	  tax	  cuts	  are	  essential	  for	  justice,	  since	  the	  stockbroker	  herself	  could	  just	  as	  easily	  turn	  out	  to	  be	  a	  single	  mother	  from	  Mississippi	  who	  would	  benefit	  from	  the	  welfare	  system	  that	  taxes	  help	  to	  support	  once	  the	  veil	  has	  been	  lifted.	  The	  veil	  of	  ignorance	  thus	  ensures	  that	  members	  in	  the	  original	  position	  recognize	  society	  as	  composed	  of	  persons	  who	  each	  have	  differing	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  11	  Rawls,	  JAF,	  p.110.	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conceptions	  of	  the	  good	  that	  require	  a	  set	  of	  all-­‐purpose	  “primary	  goods,”	  (see	  page	  15)	  in	  order	  to	  pursue	  their	  various	  life	  plans.12	  	   Importantly,	  the	  veil	  of	  ignorance	  does	  not	  deprive	  parties	  in	  the	  original	  position	  of	  all	  information	  from	  which	  to	  settle	  their	  determinations	  about	  the	  principles	  of	  justice.	  Rather,	  Rawls	  takes	  them	  to	  be	  aware	  of	  certain	  general	  facts	  about	  human	  society,	  in	  addition	  to	  their	  having	  a	  thorough	  (general)	  understanding	  of	  the	  three	  fundamental	  interests.	  This	  additional	  information	  includes	  “knowledge	  of	  the	  relatively	  uncontroversial	  laws	  and	  generalizations	  derivable	  from	  economics,	  psychology,	  political	  science,	  and	  biology	  and	  other	  natural	  sciences.”13	  Beyond	  this,	  members	  in	  the	  original	  position	  also	  know	  about	  “the	  circumstances	  of	  justice—moderate	  scarcity	  and	  limited	  altruism—as	  well	  as	  the	  desirability	  of	  the	  “primary	  social	  goods”	  that	  are	  needed	  to	  live	  a	  good	  life	  and	  to	  develop	  their	  “moral	  powers.””14	  	   One	  additional	  point	  about	  the	  original	  position	  is	  that	  the	  principles	  and	  institutions	  derived	  from	  it	  have	  a	  limited	  scope,	  applicable	  only	  to	  a	  well-­‐ordered	  society.	  This	  means	  that	  Justice	  as	  Fairness	  is	  only	  supposed	  to	  function	  at	  the	  level	  of	  ideal	  theory,	  for	  which	  it	  is	  assumed	  that	  “everyone	  strictly	  complies	  with,	  and	  so	  abides	  by,	  the	  principles	  of	  justice.”15	  At	  the	  institutional	  level,	  a	  regime	  type	  is	  understood	  as	  recognizing	  the	  principle	  of	  justice	  at	  the	  level	  of	  ideal	  theory	  if	  the	  regime	  type	  1)	  aims	  at	  these	  principles	  and	  2)	  includes	  arrangements	  that	  seek	  said	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  12	  Rawls,	  JAF,	  p.15.	  13	  Freeman,	  OP.	  14	  Freeman	  OP.	  15	  Rawls,	  JAF,	  p.13.	  This	  first	  requirement	  follows	  from	  the	  assumption	  that	  “if	  a	  regime	  does	  not	  try	  to	  realize	  certain	  political	  values,	  it	  will	  not	  in	  fact	  do	  so”	  while	  the	  second	  excludes	  regimes	  that	  aim	  at	  justice	  in	  a	  way	  that	  is	  incompatible	  with	  “basic	  laws	  of	  human	  behavior	  and	  social	  and	  economic	  organization”	  since	  no	  democratic	  human	  society	  can	  function	  in	  such	  a	  way	  (Rawls,	  JAF,	  137).	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principles	  in	  a	  way	  that	  is	  compatible	  with	  the	  general	  laws	  of	  political	  sociology.16	  By	  limiting	  the	  scope	  of	  Justice	  as	  Fairness	  to	  the	  level	  of	  ideal	  theory	  Rawls	  is	  effectively	  theorizing	  about	  “what	  a	  perfectly	  just,	  or	  nearly	  just,	  constitutional	  regime	  might	  be	  like,	  and	  whether	  it	  may	  come	  about	  and	  be	  made	  stable	  under	  the	  circumstances	  of	  justice.”17	  
3.	  Basic	  Structure	  of	  Society	  With	  this	  information	  in	  hand,	  members	  in	  the	  original	  position	  set	  out	  to	  answer	  what	  social	  justice	  demands	  of	  the	  basic	  structure	  of	  society.18	  The	  principles	  of	  justice	  aim	  at	  structuring	  only	  the	  basic	  institutions	  of	  society	  rather	  than	  trying	  to	  regulate	  all	  social	  institutions,	  because	  the	  basic	  institutions	  are	  those	  that	  are	  needed	  to	  ensure	  the	  full	  development	  and	  exercise	  of	  the	  moral	  powers.	  As	  Samuel	  Freeman	  puts	  it,	  “What	  makes	  these	  [basic]	  institutions	  and	  their	  arrangement	  the	  first	  subject	  for	  principles	  of	  social	  justice	  is	  that	  they	  are	  all	  necessary	  to	  social	  cooperation	  and	  moreover	  have…profound	  influences	  on	  our	  situations,	  aims,	  characters,	  and	  future	  prospects.”19	  The	  institutions	  that	  fit	  the	  bill	  of	  being	  “basic”	  in	  this	  sense	  are	  “the	  political	  constitution	  and	  framework	  for	  the	  legal	  system;	  the	  system	  of	  trials	  for	  adjudicating	  disputes;	  the	  norms	  of	  property,	  its	  transfer,	  contractual	  relations…and	  finally	  norms	  that	  define	  and	  regulate	  permissible	  forms	  of	  the	  family.”20	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  16	  Arnold,	  Samuel.	  “Right-­‐wing	  Rawlsianism:	  A	  Critique.”	  Journal	  of	  Political	  Philosophy,	  21:	  382–404.	  doi:	  10.1111/jopp.12001.p.391.(2013).	  	  17	  Rawls,	  JAF,	  p.13.	  18	  Rawls,	  JAF,	  p.10.	  19	  Freeman,	  OP.	  20	  Freeman,	  OP.	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Many	  social	  institutions	  that	  fall	  outside	  of	  the	  realm	  of	  the	  basic	  structure	  of	  society	  may	  still	  be	  deemed	  important	  for	  some	  individuals	  and	  cultures,	  such	  as	  the	  institution	  of	  religion.	  However,	  because	  these	  institutions	  are	  not	  necessary	  to	  guarantee	  the	  full	  development	  and	  exercise	  of	  the	  moral	  powers	  for	  all	  citizens,	  they	  are	  not	  the	  primary	  focus	  of	  the	  principles	  of	  justice.	  Instead,	  the	  principles	  of	  justice	  focus	  solely	  on	  the	  aforementioned	  basic	  institutions	  and	  so	  only	  affect	  other	  non-­‐basic	  social	  institutions	  indirectly.	  	  In	  summation,	  the	  original	  position	  guides	  parties	  behind	  the	  veil	  of	  ignorance	  to	  select	  principles	  of	  justice	  for	  the	  basic	  structure	  of	  society	  that	  are	  fair	  and	  that	  would	  allow	  them	  to	  develop	  their	  three	  fundamental	  interests:	  the	  two	  moral	  powers	  of	  personality	  and	  their	  own	  particular	  conception	  of	  the	  good,	  whatever	  that	  turns	  out	  to	  be	  once	  the	  veil	  of	  ignorance	  has	  been	  lifted.	  Furthermore,	  this	  decision	  once	  formed	  is	  nonnegotiable,	  meaning	  that	  whatever	  principles	  are	  chosen	  while	  behind	  the	  veil	  will	  remain	  in	  effect,	  regardless	  of	  what	  a	  person’s	  particular	  conception	  of	  the	  good	  turns	  out	  to	  be	  once	  the	  veil	  of	  ignorance	  has	  been	  lifted.21	  In	  this	  way,	  parties	  in	  the	  original	  position	  must	  weigh	  their	  options	  heavily,	  since	  the	  future	  fulfillment	  of	  their	  fundamental	  interests	  depends	  wholly	  on	  the	  outcome	  of	  this	  deliberation.	  
5.	  Maximin	  Rule	  	  With	  these	  limitations	  explained,	  we	  can	  now	  return	  to	  the	  original	  position	  to	  see	  what	  else	  is	  required	  to	  reach	  a	  set	  of	  principles	  that	  will	  simultaneously	  allow	  the	  moral	  powers	  of	  personality	  to	  thrive	  while	  also	  maximizing	  the	  amount	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  21	  Rawls,	  JAF,	  p.16.	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of	  opportunities	  each	  individual	  has	  for	  pursuing	  his	  or	  her	  own	  particular	  conception	  of	  the	  good,	  whatever	  that	  conception	  is	  revealed	  to	  be	  once	  the	  veil	  of	  ignorance	  has	  been	  lifted.	  But	  how	  exactly	  might	  a	  reasonable,	  and	  rational	  individual	  set	  about	  choosing	  principles	  of	  justice	  when	  confronted	  with	  this	  hypothetical	  scenario?	  	  Rawls	  theorizes	  that	  in	  the	  face	  of	  such	  uncertainty—being	  just	  as	  likely	  to	  find	  yourself	  the	  CEO	  of	  a	  Fortune	  500	  company	  as	  the	  fry	  cook	  at	  your	  local	  fast	  food	  chain	  restaurant—parties	  in	  the	  original	  position	  would	  choose	  to	  apply	  the	  maximin	  rule	  for	  picking	  between	  alternative	  principles	  of	  justice.	  The	  maximin	  rule	  directs	  individuals	  in	  the	  original	  position	  “to	  identify	  the	  worst	  outcome	  of	  each	  available	  alternative	  and	  then	  to	  adopt	  the	  alternative	  whose	  worst	  outcome	  is	  better	  than	  the	  worst	  outcomes	  of	  all	  the	  other	  alternatives.”22	  Rawls	  takes	  this	  maximin	  rule	  to	  be	  the	  most	  rational	  tool	  for	  individuals	  in	  the	  original	  position	  to	  use	  because	  unlike	  other	  day-­‐to-­‐day	  deliberations,	  the	  judgment	  from	  the	  Original	  position	  is	  irrevocable	  once	  made.	  This	  means	  that	  regardless	  of	  whether	  or	  not	  someone	  is	  more	  risk-­‐seeking	  or	  more	  risk-­‐averse	  in	  their	  everyday	  considerations,	  they	  would	  still	  tend	  towards	  a	  more	  risk-­‐averse	  approach	  when	  deliberating	  about	  how	  to	  form	  their	  societal	  institutions	  from	  the	  original	  position.	  Individuals	  in	  the	  original	  position	  have	  their	  entire	  moral	  personhood	  hanging	  in	  the	  balance,	  and	  no	  way	  of	  knowing	  whether	  or	  not	  they	  will	  fill	  the	  role	  at	  the	  top,	  at	  the	  bottom,	  or	  somewhere	  in	  between.	  Faced	  with	  such	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  22	  Rawls,	  JAF,	  p.97.	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uncertainty,	  and	  fearing	  for	  the	  worst-­‐case	  scenario,	  Rawls	  reasonably	  assumes	  that	  these	  individuals	  would	  rationally	  choose	  to	  apply	  the	  maximin	  rule.23	  
6.	  Principles	  of	  Justice	  vs.	  Principle	  of	  Average	  Utility	  	   With	  this	  rule	  guiding	  the	  deliberations	  of	  parties	  in	  the	  original	  position,	  Rawls’	  next	  move	  is	  to	  identify	  which	  principles	  in	  particular	  guarantee	  this	  best,	  worst	  outcome.	  For	  this,	  Rawls	  proposes	  the	  following	  two	  principles:	  1. Each	  person	  has	  the	  same	  indefeasible	  claim	  to	  a	  fully	  adequate	  scheme	  of	  equal	  basic	  liberties,	  which	  scheme	  is	  compatible	  with	  the	  same	  scheme	  of	  liberties	  for	  all;	  and	  	  2. Social	  and	  economic	  inequalities	  are	  to	  satisfy	  two	  conditions:	  first,	  they	  are	  to	  be	  attached	  to	  offices	  and	  positions	  open	  to	  all	  under	  conditions	  of	  fair	  equality	  of	  opportunity;	  and	  second,	  they	  are	  to	  be	  to	  the	  greatest	  benefit	  of	  the	  least-­‐advantaged	  members	  of	  society	  (the	  difference	  principle).24	  	   These	  principles	  are	  designed	  to	  ensure	  that	  individuals	  in	  the	  original	  position	  can	  procure	  a	  set	  of	  “primary	  goods”	  “that	  every	  rational	  man	  is	  presumed	  to	  want”	  i.e.	  that	  are	  essential	  for	  the	  full	  development	  of	  the	  two	  moral	  powers	  of	  reasonableness	  and	  rationality	  and	  that	  offer	  the	  greatest	  opportunity	  for	  satisfying	  citizens’	  own	  conception	  of	  the	  good	  life,	  whatever	  they	  discover	  that	  conception	  to	  be.25	  The	  list	  of	  goods	  Rawls	  takes	  to	  be	  primary	  includes:	  	  1. Basic	  Liberties	  (including	  the	  political	  liberties,	  liberty	  of	  conscience	  and	  freedom	  of	  association,	  freedom	  and	  integrity	  of	  the	  person	  and	  the	  rights	  covered	  by	  the	  rule	  of	  law);26	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  23	  Rawls,	  JAF,	  p.	  109n33.	  24	  Rawls,	  JAF,	  p.42.	  25	  Rawls,	  TJ,	  p.62.	  26	  The	  Basic	  rights	  are	  helpfully	  fleshed	  out	  by	  Thomas	  Pogge	  in	  the	  following	  way:	  1. Political	  liberties:	  freedom	  of	  thought	  and	  of	  political	  speech,	  freedom	  of	  the	  press,	  freedom	  of	  assembly	  and	  the	  right	  to	  vote	  and	  hold	  public	  office.	  	  2. Liberty	  of	  conscience	  and	  freedom	  of	  association,	  which	  between	  them	  cover	  freedom	  of	  religion.	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2. Freedom	  of	  movement	  and	  occupational	  choice;	  3. Powers	  and	  prerogatives	  of	  office;	  4. Income	  and	  wealth;	  and,	  	  5. The	  social	  bases	  of	  self-­‐respect.27	  	  Rawls’	  first	  principle	  governs	  the	  first	  two	  sets	  of	  goods;	  his	  second	  principle	  governs	  the	  remainder.	  One	  alternative	  to	  Rawls’	  principles	  of	  justice	  is	  the	  principle	  of	  average	  utility,	  which	  recommends	  that	  the	  basic	  structure	  of	  society	  be	  designed	  so	  as	  to	  produce	  the	  highest	  level	  of	  utility	  or	  welfare	  averaged	  among	  all	  citizens.28	  Comparing	  these	  two	  options	  from	  the	  perspective	  of	  a	  party	  in	  the	  original	  position,	  the	  principles	  of	  justice	  are	  the	  better	  choice	  because	  they	  guarantee	  the	  better	  worst-­‐case	  scenario.	  Inferring	  from	  the	  contents	  of	  the	  principles	  of	  justice,	  it	  is	  evident	  that	  no	  matter	  which	  position	  one	  holds,	  once	  the	  veil	  of	  ignorance	  has	  been	  lifted,	  every	  person	  will,	  at	  the	  very	  least,	  have	  their	  most	  prized	  liberties	  protected,	  thus	  ensuring	  the	  effective	  development	  and	  exercise	  of	  their	  two	  moral	  powers,	  and	  to	  a	  greater	  extent,	  their	  ability	  to	  pursue	  their	  own	  particular	  conception	  of	  the	  good	  life.	  	  	   Conversely,	  the	  principle	  of	  average	  utility	  could	  allow	  individuals	  to	  have	  their	  basic	  rights	  restricted	  if	  such	  restriction	  would	  result	  in	  greater	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  3. Freedom	  and	  integrity	  of	  the	  person,	  which	  are	  incompatible	  with	  slavery	  and	  serfdom,	  and	  which	  also	  include	  freedom	  from	  psychological	  oppression…and	  the	  right	  to	  hold	  personal	  property	  (not	  including	  rights	  to	  inheritance,	  rights	  to	  hold	  personal	  property	  in	  means	  of	  production	  and	  natural	  resources,	  or	  rights	  to	  share	  collective	  control	  of	  means	  of	  production	  and	  natural	  resources.	  4. The	  rights	  covered	  by	  the	  rule	  of	  law:	  protection	  from	  arbitrary	  arrest	  and	  seizure,	  habeas	  corpus,	  the	  right	  to	  a	  speedy	  trial,	  due	  process,	  and	  uniform	  procedures	  conducted	  according	  to	  publicized	  rules.	  (Pogge,	  Thomas,	  and	  Michelle	  Kosch.	  John	  Rawls:	  His	  Life	  and	  Theory	  of	  Justice.	  Oxford:	  Oxford	  UP,	  p.83.	  2007.	  Print.)	  27	  Pogge,	  JR,	  p.73.	  28	  Wenar,	  Leif,	  "John	  Rawls",	  The	  Stanford	  Encyclopedia	  of	  Philosophy	  (Winter	  2013	  Edition),	  Edward	  N.	  Zalta	  (ed.),	  URL	  =	  <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2013/entries/rawls/>. 
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overall	  social	  welfare.	  In	  essence,	  this	  principle	  could	  permit	  a	  subset	  of	  society	  to	  be	  forced	  into	  performing	  all	  of	  society’s	  most	  laborious	  tasks	  so	  that	  the	  majority	  could	  live	  lavishly.	  Someone	  in	  the	  original	  position	  would	  clearly	  fear	  such	  an	  outcome	  since	  he	  or	  she	  could	  just	  as	  likely	  be	  the	  one	  forced	  into	  compulsory	  servitude	  as	  the	  one	  privileged	  to	  the	  high-­‐life.	  	  From	  this	  Rawls	  concludes	  that	  since	  parties	  in	  the	  original	  position	  “would	  never	  put	  their	  basic	  rights	  and	  liberties	  in	  jeopardy	  so	  long	  as	  there	  was	  a	  readily	  available	  and	  satisfactory	  alternative”	  they	  would,	  acting	  in	  accordance	  with	  the	  maximin	  rule,	  choose	  the	  principles	  of	  justice	  over	  the	  principle	  of	  average	  utility.29	  	  
7.	  Principles	  of	  Justice	  vs.	  System	  of	  Natural	  Liberty	  Beyond	  their	  desire	  to	  have	  their	  basic	  liberties	  protected,	  individuals	  in	  the	  original	  position	  have	  an	  additional	  desire	  to	  have	  their	  other	  primary	  goods,	  including	  “powers	  and	  prerogatives	  of	  office,	  income	  and	  wealth	  and	  the	  social	  bases	  of	  self-­‐respect”	  fairly	  distributed.	  To	  prevent	  unfair	  distributions,	  individuals	  in	  the	  original	  position	  would	  desire	  an	  additional	  restriction,	  the	  second	  principle	  of	  justice,	  to	  cover	  these	  goods.	  An	  alternative	  to	  the	  second	  principle	  of	  justice	  is	  “the	  system	  of	  natural	  liberty,”	  which	  picks	  out	  free	  market	  institutional	  arrangements	  and	  “careers	  open	  to	  talents.”30	  At	  the	  outset,	  the	  system	  of	  natural	  liberty	  may	  seem	  just	  since	  the	  requirement	  of	  careers	  open	  to	  talents	  ensures	  that	  society	  begins	  with	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  29Rawls,	  JAF,	  p.102.	  30	  Rawls,	  TJ,	  p.72.	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individuals	  having	  the	  same	  formal	  opportunity	  to	  go	  after	  the	  positions	  that	  reap	  the	  most	  social	  and	  economic	  rewards.	  However,	  overtime,	  those	  who	  do	  win	  the	  better	  positions	  in	  society	  also	  win	  a	  greater	  share	  of	  resources.	  And,	  with	  no	  compulsory	  limitation	  placed	  on	  how	  many	  resources	  or	  primary	  goods	  they	  may	  obtain,	  inequality	  in	  wealth	  would	  grow	  rampant.	  Also,	  under	  this	  system	  there	  is	  no	  guaranteed	  minimum	  income	  that	  those	  who	  do	  not	  attain	  the	  enviable	  positions	  may	  receive;	  because,	  all	  they	  are	  guaranteed	  by	  the	  first	  principle	  of	  justice	  is	  that	  their	  basic	  rights	  are	  protected.	  This	  result	  is	  impermissible	  on	  Rawls’	  account	  because	  it	  implies	  that	  in	  the	  system	  of	  natural	  liberty,	  social	  positions	  although	  formally	  open	  to	  all,	  are	  not	  practically	  open	  to	  all;	  since,	  differences	  in	  life	  prospects	  can	  be	  affected	  by	  social	  class,	  e.g.	  someone	  born	  into	  a	  wealthy	  family	  can	  more	  easily	  attain	  success	  than	  someone	  born	  into	  a	  poor	  family.31	  Conversely,	  by	  instituting	  Rawls’	  fair	  (as	  opposed	  to	  merely	  formal)	  equality	  of	  opportunity	  principle,	  members	  in	  the	  original	  position	  could	  demand	  that	  resources	  be	  provided	  to	  ensure	  that	  everyone	  has	  access	  to	  education	  and	  training	  so	  that	  they	  can	  obtain	  the	  skills	  society	  deems	  important	  for	  success,	  regardless	  of	  the	  social	  class	  they	  are	  born	  into.	  	  However,	  Rawls	  is	  quick	  to	  point	  out	  that	  this	  would	  not	  solve	  the	  whole	  problem.	  For,	  even	  if	  fair	  equality	  of	  opportunity	  eliminates	  the	  possibility	  of	  certain	  inequalities	  due	  to	  social	  position,	  “it	  still	  permits	  the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  31	  Rawls,	  TJ,	  p.73.	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distribution	  of	  wealth	  and	  income	  to	  be	  determined	  by	  the	  natural	  distribution	  of	  abilities	  and	  talents.”32	  This	  is	  because	  someone	  who	  only	  possesses	  the	  native	  talents	  to	  work	  a	  minimum	  wage	  job	  would	  not,	  in	  virtue	  of	  having	  fair	  equality	  of	  opportunity	  protected,	  all	  of	  a	  sudden	  be	  able	  to	  become	  a	  hedge	  fund	  manager.	  Instead,	  if	  their	  natural	  capacities	  were	  limited	  so	  that	  they	  can	  only	  ever	  do	  manual	  labor,	  a	  party	  in	  the	  original	  position	  would	  want	  to	  at	  least	  guarantee	  the	  highest	  minimum	  wage	  possible.	  For	  this	  reason,	  Rawls	  believes	  that	  members	  in	  the	  original	  position	  would	  include	  the	  difference	  principle	  as	  a	  component	  of	  the	  principles	  of	  justice.	  	  Adopting	  the	  default	  assumption	  that	  what	  justice	  requires	  is	  an	  equal	  distribution	  of	  social	  primary	  goods,	  Rawls	  adds	  the	  difference	  principle	  to	  stipulate	  that,	  if	  introducing	  inequalities	  in	  the	  distribution	  of	  these	  goods	  maximally	  improves	  the	  position	  of	  the	  worst-­‐off,	  then	  that	  inequality	  is	  permissible.	  	  So,	  if	  paying	  Cynthia	  more	  money	  then	  Marc	  incentivizes	  her	  to	  make	  great	  business	  deals,	  which	  in	  turn	  stimulate	  the	  economy	  and	  thereby	  raise	  Marc’s	  wages	  as	  well	  as	  Cynthia’s;	  this	  inequality	  would	  be	  mutually	  beneficial	  and	  permissible	  under	  the	  difference	  principle.	  As	  Rawls	  puts	  it,	  “the	  greater	  expectations	  allowed	  to	  entrepreneurs	  encourages	  them	  to	  do	  things	  which	  raise	  the	  long-­‐term	  prospects	  of	  [the]	  laboring	  class.	  Their	  better	  prospects	  act	  as	  incentives	  so	  that	  the	  economic	  process	  is	  more	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  32	  Rawls,	  TJ,	  p.73-­‐4.	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efficient.”33	  In	  this	  way,	  social	  and	  economic	  inequalities	  are	  forced	  to	  abide	  by	  an	  “all	  for	  one	  and	  one	  for	  all”	  format,	  such	  that	  if	  the	  elite	  are	  advantaged	  then	  so	  too	  are	  the	  poor.	  
8.	  Priority	  of	  the	  Principles	  of	  Justice	  	   Having	  shown	  why	  the	  principles	  of	  justice	  are	  preferred	  to	  both	  the	  principle	  of	  average	  utility	  and	  a	  system	  of	  natural	  liberty,	  I	  will	  now	  move	  on	  to	  explain	  the	  priority	  relationship	  of	  the	  first	  principle	  of	  justice	  over	  the	  second	  and	  the	  priority	  of	  the	  fair	  equality	  of	  opportunity	  principle	  over	  the	  difference	  principle.	  	  	   8.1	  Priority	  of	  the	  First	  Principle	  	   The	  reason	  Rawls	  prioritizes	  the	  first	  principle	  of	  justice	  over	  the	  second	  is	  because	  a	  person	  cannot	  fully	  develop	  her	  capacities	  as	  a	  rational	  and	  reasonable	  citizen	  without	  having	  her	  basic	  liberties	  protected.	  Granting	  the	  first	  principle	  priority	  means	  that	  the	  myriad	  basic	  structures	  of	  society	  that	  could	  be	  chosen	  are	  to	  be	  judged	  first	  and	  foremost	  based	  on	  “the	  distribution	  of	  basic	  rights	  and	  liberties	  each	  is	  expected	  to	  produce,”	  regardless	  of	  the	  distribution	  of	  the	  other	  primary	  goods.34	  Whichever	  structure	  achieves	  the	  maximal	  distribution	  of	  basic	  liberties	  is	  better,	  on	  Rawls’	  account	  than	  all	  others,	  because	  basic	  liberties	  are	  more	  important	  for	  satisfying	  our	  fundamental	  interests	  than	  are	  the	  other	  primary	  goods.	  35	  	   8.2	  Priority	  of	  Fair	  Equality	  of	  Opportunity	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  33	  Rawls,	  TJ,	  p.78.	  34	  Pogge,	  JR,	  p.79.	  35	  Rawls,	  JAF,	  p.46.	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   If	  it	  turns	  out	  that	  two	  structures	  both	  ensure	  that	  all	  of	  our	  basic	  liberties	  will	  be	  guaranteed,	  then	  Rawls	  says,	  we	  should	  pick	  whichever	  structure	  best	  satisfies	  the	  fair	  equality	  of	  opportunity	  principle.	  If	  the	  difference	  principle	  were	  to	  be	  considered	  on	  its	  own,	  it	  might	  conceivably	  permit	  structures	  that	  make	  it	  hard	  for	  motivated	  and	  talented	  individuals	  born	  at	  the	  low	  end	  of	  the	  income	  spectrum	  to	  attain	  good	  education	  and	  career	  opportunities,	  because	  someone	  of	  equal	  talent	  and	  motivation	  could	  be	  born	  into	  a	  family	  that	  has	  more	  connections	  and	  wealth	  and	  therefore	  can	  climb	  the	  social	  ladder	  faster.	  	  By	  mandating	  that	  fair	  equality	  of	  opportunity	  be	  given	  priority	  over	  the	  difference	  principle,	  Rawls	  rules	  out	  such	  discriminatory	  and	  unfair	  practices.36	  	   8.3	  Priority	  of	  the	  difference	  principle	  
	   Only	  after	  the	  first	  principle	  of	  justice	  and	  fair	  equality	  of	  opportunity	  have	  been	  satisfied	  can	  the	  difference	  principle	  come	  into	  play.	  	  This	  is	  not	  to	  say	  that	  the	  difference	  principle	  is	  not	  important;	  but	  rather,	  that	  a	  society	  cannot	  hope	  to	  be	  just	  if	  it	  does	  not	  at	  least	  guarantee	  the	  basic	  liberties	  and	  fair	  equality	  of	  opportunity.	  Like	  the	  other	  two	  principles,	  the	  difference	  principle	  concerns	  the	  distribution	  of	  key	  primary	  goods	  that	  are	  essential	  for	  the	  development	  of	  the	  moral	  powers.	  They	  are:	  powers	  and	  prerogatives	  of	  office,	  income	  and	  wealth	  and	  the	  social	  bases	  of	  self-­‐respect.	  This	  principle	  thus	  recommends	  that	  if	  two	  competing	  structures	  have	  already	  secured	  the	  basic	  rights	  and	  fair	  equality	  of	  opportunity,	  then	  the	  preferred	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  36	  Rawls,	  JAF,	  p.43.	  
	   22	  
structure	  is	  the	  one	  that	  maximizes	  the	  distribution	  of	  these	  three	  additional	  goods	  to	  the	  worst-­‐off.37	  
9.	  Regime	  Types	  
	   Having	  established	  what	  the	  principles	  of	  justice	  are	  and	  the	  priority	  relationship	  between	  them,	  the	  next	  question	  Rawls	  must	  answer	  concerns	  which	  institutional	  arrangements	  society	  must	  impose	  in	  order	  to	  make	  sure	  these	  principles	  are	  properly	  satisfied.	  Although	  many	  institutional	  arrangements	  could	  follow	  from	  these	  principles,	  Rawls	  only	  expands	  upon	  two	  of	  particular	  merit:	  property-­‐owning	  democracy	  and	  liberal	  (democratic)	  socialism.	  	   For	  Rawls,	  property-­‐owning	  democracy	  recognizes	  a	  limited	  range	  of	  libertarian	  commitments	  by	  allowing	  for	  restricted	  rights	  to	  the	  private	  ownership	  of	  productive	  capital.	  However,	  unlike	  a	  capitalist-­‐welfare	  state,	  economic	  power	  is	  not	  narrowly	  concentrated	  to	  an	  elite	  class,	  but	  is	  instead	  more	  broadly	  distributed.38	  One	  prominent	  goal	  of	  property-­‐owning	  democracy	  regimes	  is	  that	  they	  seek	  to	  limit	  distributional	  exchanges	  between	  generations	  by	  imposing	  a	  steep	  inheritance	  tax.	  As	  Rawls	  states,	  “the	  purpose	  of	  these	  levies	  and	  regulations	  is	  not	  to	  raise	  revenue…but	  gradually	  and	  continually	  to	  correct	  the	  distribution	  of	  wealth	  and	  to	  prevent	  concentrations	  of	  power	  detrimental	  to	  the	  fair	  value	  of	  political	  liberty	  and	  fair	  equality	  of	  opportunity.”39	  	   Property-­‐owning	  democracy	  also	  establishes	  a	  system	  of	  publicly	  funded	  educational	  institutions.	  Through	  this	  guarantee,	  property-­‐owning	  democratic	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  37	  Rawls,	  JAF,	  p.48.	  38Pogge,	  JR,	  p.133.	  39	  Rawls,	  TJ,	  p.277.	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institutions	  enable	  citizens	  to	  pursue	  their	  own	  conceptions	  of	  the	  good	  life	  “in	  such	  a	  way	  that	  they	  can	  participate,	  fully	  and	  as	  equals,	  in	  the	  economic	  and	  social	  life	  of	  their	  society	  and	  are	  motivated	  to	  do	  so	  by	  their	  secure	  sense	  of	  being,	  and	  being	  seen	  and	  treated	  as,	  equal	  citizens.”40	  Other	  essential	  programs	  are	  ensured	  through	  a	  similar	  process	  of	  public	  funding	  and	  subsidization,	  including	  government	  funding	  for	  political	  campaigns	  and	  possibly	  a	  nationalized	  health	  care	  program.41	  	  	   The	  second	  regime	  type	  that	  Rawls	  proposes	  calls	  for	  a	  completely	  different	  set	  of	  institutions.	  Liberal	  democratic	  socialism	  forbids	  ownership	  of	  private	  productive	  property	  but	  permits	  collective,	  democratic	  ownership	  of	  production.	  In	  this	  way,	  innovation	  is	  fueled	  by	  competing,	  worker-­‐managed	  firms,	  which	  vie	  for	  economic	  prominence	  within	  a	  market	  socialist	  economy.42	  However,	  in	  terms	  of	  all	  other	  institutional	  aspects,	  including	  education,	  health	  care,	  and	  political	  funding,	  liberal	  democratic	  socialism	  would	  closely	  parallel	  property-­‐owning	  democracy	  by	  relying	  on	  tax-­‐funded	  welfare	  programs.43	  
10.	  Summary	  In	  outlining	  the	  principles	  of	  justice	  and	  proposing	  the	  aforementioned	  institutional	  arrangements	  of	  property-­‐owning	  democracy	  and	  limited	  democratic	  socialism,	  Rawls	  has	  methodically	  worked	  out	  an	  answer	  to	  the	  question	  of	  what	  justice	  requires.	  In	  what	  follows	  I	  will	  present	  a	  new	  interpretation	  of	  Rawls’	  theory	  of	  Justice	  as	  Fairness,	  which	  modifies	  in	  important	  ways	  the	  content	  of	  Rawls’	  first	  principle	  of	  justice	  and	  the	  requirement	  of	  the	  second	  principle	  of	  justice	  to	  result	  in	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  40	  Pogge,	  JR,	  p.134.	  41	  Tomasi,	  FMF,	  p.114.	  42	  Tomasi,	  FMF,	  p.115.	  43	  Tomasi,	  FMF,	  p.115.	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Chapter	  2.	  
Tomasi’s	  Hybrid	  Alternative	  	  “Increases	  in	  prosperity	  increase	  the	  value	  of	  liberty…in	  many	  ways,	  wealth	  fuels	  the	  experience	  of	  freedom	  itself”	  	   -­‐	  John	  Tomasi,	  Free	  Market	  Fairness	  	  
1.	  Interpreting	  Justice	  as	  Fairness	  In	  his	  book	  Free	  Market	  Fairness,	  John	  Tomasi	  takes	  up	  Rawls’	  theory	  of	  Justice	  as	  Fairness	  and	  reinterprets	  it	  from	  what	  he	  terms	  a	  “market	  democratic”	  perspective.	  	  This	  interpretation	  dramatically	  extends	  Rawls’	  theory	  to	  recognize	  economic	  liberties	  and	  free	  markets	  as	  essential	  for	  ensuring	  the	  full	  development	  and	  exercise	  of	  the	  two	  moral	  powers	  of	  personality.	  Tomasi’s	  interpretation	  integrates	  two	  seemingly	  conflicting	  philosophical	  theories	  into	  one	  new	  liberal	  political	  theory;	  by	  bringing	  together	  the	  “high	  liberal”	  demand	  for	  social	  justice	  and	  fairness	  with	  the	  libertarian	  and	  classical	  liberal	  demand	  for	  free	  markets	  and	  private	  economic	  liberties.	  	  On	  the	  one	  hand,	  Tomasi	  seeks	  to	  maintain	  many	  of	  Rawls’	  substantial	  high	  liberal,	  or	  left-­‐liberal	  values,	  such	  as	  the	  importance	  of	  basic	  liberties	  in	  defining	  social	  justice	  and	  the	  requirement	  of	  respecting	  the	  self-­‐authorship	  of	  all	  citizens	  by	  ensuring	  that	  they	  are	  able	  to	  fully	  develop	  their	  moral	  powers	  of	  reasonableness	  and	  rationality.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  Tomasi	  disagrees	  with	  Rawls’	  limited	  list	  of	  basic	  liberties	  and	  the	  high	  liberal,	  institutional	  demand	  that	  society	  ought	  to	  allow	  for	  government	  involvement	  in	  the	  economy	  and	  avoid	  laissez-­‐faire	  capitalism.	  The	  reason	  Tomasi	  renounces	  these	  high	  liberal	  values	  is	  that	  he	  sees	  democratic	  legitimacy	  as	  requiring	  that	  a	  more	  substantial	  set	  of	  economic	  liberties	  be	  included	  in	  Rawls’	  top	  tier	  of	  primary	  goods.	  For	  Tomasi,	  this	  more	  extensive	  list	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includes	  the	  right	  to	  negotiate	  one’s	  own	  specific	  terms	  of	  employment	  and	  the	  right	  to	  own	  private	  productive	  property.44	  By	  demanding	  that	  this	  more	  robust	  set	  of	  economic	  liberties	  be	  included	  in	  Rawls’	  list	  of	  basic	  liberties,	  Tomasi	  is	  effectively	  challenging	  the	  Rawlsian	  assumption	  that	  “laissez-­‐faire	  capitalism…secures	  only	  formal	  equality	  and	  rejects	  both	  the	  fair	  value	  of	  the	  political	  liberties	  and	  fair	  equality	  of	  opportunity.”45	  	  To	  help	  motivate	  his	  contention	  that	  ownership	  of	  private	  productive	  property	  is	  essential	  for	  the	  full	  development	  of	  our	  moral	  character,	  Tomasi	  provides	  us	  with	  the	  example	  of	  a	  high	  school	  drop	  out	  turned	  entrepreneur.	  As	  the	  example	  goes,	  after	  dropping	  out	  of	  school	  Amy	  works	  diligently	  for	  years,	  saving	  up	  her	  pennies	  so	  that	  she	  can	  acquire	  a	  loan	  and	  open	  up	  her	  own	  pet	  grooming	  shop,	  “Amy’s	  Pup-­‐in-­‐the-­‐Tub.”46	  For	  Amy,	  owning	  her	  own	  store	  provides	  her	  the	  economic	  security	  and	  freedom	  to	  rely	  on	  her	  own	  labor	  rather	  than	  making	  her	  dependent	  on	  the	  state.	  Beyond	  this,	  Amy’s	  ownership	  over	  her	  property	  is	  also	  valuable	  in	  virtue	  of	  its	  relation	  to	  her	  sense	  of	  self-­‐identity.	  As	  Tomasi	  puts	  it,	  “societies	  that	  protect	  the	  private	  ownership	  of	  productive	  property	  as	  a	  basic	  right	  increase	  the	  range	  of	  projects,	  and	  the	  forms	  of	  economic	  relationships,	  that	  are	  available	  to	  citizens”	  by	  “broaden[ing]	  the	  evaluative	  horizons	  of	  citizens.”47	  For	  these	  reasons,	  Tomasi	  purports	  to	  show	  that	  ownership	  of	  private	  productive	  property	  is	  essential	  and	  basic	  in	  the	  same	  sense	  as	  are	  Rawls’	  other	  basic	  liberties.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  44	  Tomasi,	  FMF,	  p.81.	  45	  Rawls,	  JAF,	  p.137.	  46	  Tomasi,	  FMF,	  p.66.	  47	  Tomasi,	  FMF,	  p.79.	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   In	  addition	  to	  this,	  Tomasi	  suggests	  that	  the	  right	  to	  specify	  one’s	  own	  terms	  of	  employment	  is	  also	  essential	  for	  ensuring	  the	  full	  development	  of	  one’s	  moral	  character.	  His	  rationale	  for	  this	  is	  that	  “if	  the	  freedom	  to	  choose	  an	  occupation	  is	  essential	  to	  the	  development	  of	  the	  moral	  powers”	  as	  Rawls	  suggests	  it	  is,	  then	  “the	  freedom	  to	  sell,	  trade,	  and	  donate	  one’s	  labor	  looks	  equally	  essential	  for	  the	  same	  reason.	  After	  all,	  one	  is	  defined	  by	  one’s	  workplace	  experience	  not	  simply	  by	  what	  profession	  one	  pursues.”48	  Hence,	  for	  Tomasi,	  the	  economic	  freedom	  to	  negotiate	  one’s	  terms	  of	  employment	  is	  just	  as	  necessary	  for	  guaranteeing	  the	  two	  moral	  powers	  as	  are	  the	  other	  basic	  liberties	  that	  Rawls	  includes	  in	  his	  list.	  In	  the	  succeeding	  sections	  I	  will	  contrast	  and	  compare	  Rawls’	  high	  liberal	  theory	  of	  justice	  as	  fairness	  with	  Tomasi’s	  alternative,	  and	  determine	  what	  these	  differences	  mean	  for	  Tomasi’s	  theory	  at	  the	  level	  of	  both	  principled	  and	  institutional	  justification.	  
2.	  Similarities	  In	  devising	  free	  market	  fairness,	  Tomasi	  adopts	  a	  very	  similar	  theoretical	  framework	  to	  Rawls.	  Included	  in	  this	  is	  Rawls’	  idea	  of	  a	  democratic	  society	  as	  “a	  fair	  system	  of	  cooperation	  among	  citizens	  committed	  to	  respecting	  one	  another	  as	  responsible	  self-­‐authors.”49	  To	  ensure	  that	  justice	  is	  met	  in	  such	  a	  society,	  both	  free	  market	  fairness	  and	  justice	  as	  fairness	  aim	  at	  developing	  the	  basic	  structure	  of	  society	  in	  such	  a	  way	  as	  to	  enable	  citizens	  to	  develop	  and	  exercise	  their	  two	  moral	  powers	  of	  reasonableness	  and	  rationality.	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In	  addition	  to	  these	  theories	  sharing	  the	  same	  end	  goal,	  free	  market	  fairness	  also	  mirrors	  justice	  as	  fairness	  in	  its	  use	  of	  the	  Rawlsian	  distribution	  criterion,	  or	  difference	  principle.	  Both	  Tomasi	  and	  Rawls	  allow	  a	  divergence	  from	  an	  egalitarian	  distribution	  of	  the	  “DP”	  primary	  goods,	  but	  only	  on	  the	  condition	  that	  that	  unequal	  distribution	  improves	  the	  condition	  of	  the	  worst-­‐off	  members	  of	  society.	  50	  A	  third	  similarity	  between	  free	  market	  fairness	  and	  justice	  as	  fairness	  is	  that	  both	  theories	  are	  presumed	  to	  operate	  at	  the	  level	  of	  ideal	  theory.	  As	  a	  reminder	  to	  the	  reader,	  ideal	  theory	  uses	  a	  two-­‐part	  test	  to	  determine	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  a	  potential	  regime	  type	  may	  meet	  the	  requirements	  of	  justice.	  First,	  it	  must	  have	  justice	  as	  its	  goal.	  Second,	  the	  regime	  type	  must	  be	  possible	  from	  a	  sociologically	  realistic	  perspective.51	  Anything	  that	  falls	  within	  these	  two	  constraints	  is	  justifiable	  by	  ideal	  theory	  standards,	  regardless	  of	  whether	  or	  not	  transition	  to	  it	  is	  feasible	  from	  our	  current	  institutional	  arrangement.	  This	  is	  a	  way	  of	  preventing	  the	  requirements	  of	  justice	  from	  being	  “tainted”	  by	  practical	  considerations	  that	  are	  fundamentally,	  morally	  irrelevant	  and	  that	  risk	  privileging	  the	  status	  quo.	  It	  also	  means	  (as	  will	  become	  apparent	  later)	  that	  both	  Rawls’	  and	  Tomasi’s	  institutional	  recommendations	  are	  immune	  to	  certain	  empirically	  oriented	  objections.	  
3.	  The	  Range	  of	  Self-­‐Authorship	  As	  has	  been	  said,	  Tomasi	  believes	  that	  a	  thick	  conception	  of	  economic	  liberties	  is	  essential	  for	  justice.	  By	  this	  he	  means	  that	  in	  order	  for	  citizens	  to	  fully	  exercise	  and	  develop	  their	  moral	  powers,	  their	  economic	  liberties	  in	  conjunction	  with	  their	  other	  basic	  liberties	  must	  be	  protected.	  To	  better	  understand	  how	  a	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thicker	  conception	  of	  economic	  liberties	  could	  be	  viewed	  as	  essential	  for	  guaranteeing	  the	  development	  of	  these	  two	  moral	  powers,	  Tomasi	  introduces	  the	  idea	  of	  a	  range	  of	  self-­‐authorship.	  The	  upper	  limit	  of	  this	  range	  suggests	  that	  if	  the	  economic	  liberties	  are	  restricted	  too	  much,	  either	  by	  extensive	  economic	  regulations	  or	  high	  tax	  rates,	  then	  this	  could	  prove	  unbearably	  onerous	  to	  the	  point	  of	  infringing	  on	  individuals’	  abilities	  to	  practice	  responsible	  self-­‐authorship	  and	  by	  extension,	  their	  ability	  to	  exercise	  their	  moral	  powers.	  Thus,	  justice	  requires	  the	  protection	  of	  economic	  liberties.	  	  Conversely,	  the	  range	  of	  self-­‐authorship	  cannot	  allow	  the	  economic	  liberties	  to	  have	  too	  much	  free	  reign,	  since	  doing	  so	  would	  prohibit	  any	  form	  of	  redistribution	  of	  income	  and	  wealth,	  thus	  making	  any	  kind	  of	  tax-­‐funded,	  social	  safety	  net	  impermissible.	  This	  in	  turn	  would	  result	  in	  some	  individuals	  incurring	  extreme	  levels	  of	  poverty	  and	  limited	  opportunities	  for	  education,	  which	  likewise	  threaten	  the	  development	  of	  the	  two	  moral	  powers.52	  Thus,	  justice	  requires	  that	  the	  protection	  of	  the	  economic	  liberties	  be	  restricted	  while	  also	  being	  considered	  basic.53	  In	  this	  way,	  Tomasi	  takes	  the	  economic	  liberties	  to	  be	  essential	  for	  individuals	  to	  practice	  their	  responsible	  self-­‐authorship.	  But	  he	  does	  not	  go	  so	  far	  as	  to	  claim	  that	  the	  economic	  liberties	  are	  invariant	  across	  all	  social	  conditions,	  as	  say	  a	  Libertarian	  might.	  For	  Tomasi,	  the	  range	  of	  self-­‐authorship	  exists	  on	  a	  sliding	  scale	  that	  varies	  across	  different	  sociological,	  economic	  and	  political	  settings.	  For	  example,	  one	  sociological	  setting	  may	  result	  in	  economic	  liberties	  being	  more	  essential	  for	  realizing	  self-­‐authorship	  than	  another	  and	  as	  a	  result,	  in	  this	  society	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extensive	  tax-­‐funded	  social	  welfare	  programs	  would	  infringe	  on	  citizens’	  right	  to	  their	  own	  income.54	  	  
4.	  Market	  Democratic	  Regimes	  At	  the	  institutional	  level,	  Tomasi	  hopes	  to	  show	  that	  his	  “market	  democratic”	  regimes	  are	  just	  as	  sensitive	  to	  the	  requirements	  of	  social	  justice	  as	  are	  the	  “social	  democratic”	  regimes	  of	  property-­‐owning	  democracy	  and	  liberal	  democratic	  socialism,	  which	  Rawls	  recommends.	  However,	  beyond	  market	  democratic	  institutions	  simply	  being	  on	  par	  with	  Rawls’	  social	  democratic	  institutions,	  Tomasi	  suggests	  that	  the	  market	  democratic	  interpretation	  of	  social	  justice,	  which	  picks	  out	  these	  market	  democratic	  regimes,	  is	  in	  fact	  superior	  to	  Rawls’	  social	  democratic	  interpretation.	  Tomasi	  believes	  that	  free	  market	  fairness,	  is	  morally	  superior	  to	  Rawls’	  social	  democratic,	  justice	  as	  fairness	  in	  virtue	  of	  the	  fact	  that	  “any	  conception	  of	  liberal	  justice	  that	  diminishes	  the	  agency	  of	  individuals	  with	  respect	  to	  the	  deeply	  personal	  economic	  choices	  that	  structure	  their	  lives…is	  defective	  from	  the	  moral	  point	  of	  view.”55	  	  	   Competing	  with	  the	  social	  democratic	  regimes	  of	  property-­‐owning	  democracy	  and	  liberal	  democratic	  socialism	  are	  Tomasi’s	  two	  market	  democratic	  regime	  types:	  democratic	  laissez-­‐faire	  and	  democratic	  limited	  government.	  Commonalities	  between	  these	  two	  market	  democratic	  regime	  types	  include	  their	  joint	  commitment	  to	  limiting	  government	  involvement	  in	  economic	  affairs	  and	  their	  acknowledgment	  that	  some	  state	  involvement	  is	  necessary	  to	  “create	  tax-­‐funded	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safety	  nets	  for	  citizens	  in	  great	  need.”56	  Additionally,	  both	  of	  these	  regime	  types	  uphold	  the	  primary	  maxim	  of	  market	  democracy	  that	  private	  economic	  liberties	  are	  among	  the	  basic	  liberties	  of	  all	  citizens.	  57	  Unlike	  their	  social-­‐democratic	  counterparts,	  these	  market	  democratic	  regimes	  steer	  clear	  of	  resolving	  the	  issue	  of	  ensuring	  equal	  opportunity	  for	  all	  by	  having	  all	  educational	  programs,	  healthcare	  programs	  and	  legal	  programs	  be	  administered	  by	  the	  government.	  Instead,	  these	  regimes	  reflect	  the	  classical	  liberal	  preference	  for	  free	  market	  competition.	  For	  example,	  in	  the	  case	  of	  education,	  market-­‐democratic	  regimes	  favor	  tax-­‐funded	  voucher	  programs	  that	  would	  allow	  individuals	  in	  economically	  dire	  straits	  to	  use	  vouchers	  to	  offset	  the	  costs	  of	  attending	  private	  educational	  institutions,	  rather	  than	  having	  highly	  regulated	  public	  schooling	  systems.58	  Hence,	  market	  democratic	  regimes	  favor	  private-­‐public	  partnerships,	  which	  are	  supposed	  to	  arise	  naturally	  from	  a	  spontaneous	  order,	  rather	  than	  favoring	  direct	  government	  involvement.	  	  	   Democratic	  laissez	  faire	  closely	  parallels	  institutional	  arrangements	  favored	  by	  many	  libertarian	  thinkers.	  This	  institutional	  arrangement	  would	  allow	  for	  an	  almost	  entirely	  privatized	  education	  system	  that	  would	  encourage	  educational	  innovation	  by	  making	  schools	  and	  universities	  more	  differentiated	  and	  competitive.	  In	  addition	  to	  privatizing	  education,	  a	  democratic	  laissez	  faire	  regime	  would	  allow	  for	  only	  a	  minimal	  social	  safety	  net.	  In	  terms	  of	  providing	  health	  care	  to	  those	  in	  need,	  democratic	  laissez	  faire	  would	  permit	  giving	  individuals	  living	  in	  extreme	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poverty	  a	  limited	  amount	  of	  money	  to	  purchase	  medical	  insurance	  from	  an	  open	  healthcare	  market,	  thus	  ensuring	  that	  their	  medical	  needs	  are	  met	  while	  simultaneously	  allowing	  for	  privatized	  healthcare	  providers	  to	  maintain	  their	  autonomy	  from	  strict	  government	  oversight.	  59	  	   Conversely,	  democratic	  limited	  government	  has	  a	  slightly	  more	  liberal	  bent	  than	  does	  democratic	  laissez	  faire	  in	  that	  it	  allows	  for	  a	  greater	  degree	  of	  government	  involvement	  in	  economic	  affairs.60	  	  In	  terms	  of	  education,	  democratic	  limited	  government	  could	  permit	  tax-­‐funded	  support	  for	  education	  in	  a	  myriad	  of	  forms,	  from	  “a	  tax	  credit	  for	  tuition	  payment,	  to	  a	  safety-­‐net	  voucher	  program,	  to	  a	  universal	  voucher	  program.”61	  Additionally,	  democratic	  limited	  government	  could	  impose	  certain	  accreditation	  requirements	  so	  as	  to	  ensure	  that	  a	  minimum	  quality	  threshold	  be	  met	  at	  the	  national	  level.	  This	  regime	  type	  is	  also	  compatible	  with	  a	  universal	  guaranteed	  minimum	  income	  and	  tax-­‐funded	  grants	  for	  health	  insurance.	  	   Overall,	  although	  these	  two	  regime	  types	  may	  dispute	  the	  best	  way	  to	  go	  about	  implementing	  institutional	  social	  service	  programs,	  both	  still	  preserve	  the	  primary	  requirements	  of	  free	  market	  fairness.	  	  Both	  democratic	  laissez-­‐faire	  and	  democratic	  limited	  government	  uphold	  the	  market	  democratic	  maxim	  that	  private	  economic	  liberties	  are	  on	  par	  with	  basic	  liberties,	  and	  that	  the	  best	  way	  to	  resolve	  unjust	  distributions	  of	  primary	  goods	  is	  through	  a	  reliance	  on	  spontaneous	  order	  and	  the	  natural	  efficiency	  of	  free	  markets.	  However,	  both	  of	  these	  regimes	  also	  admit	  that	  markets	  are	  imperfect	  and	  for	  this	  reason,	  see	  taxes	  as	  necessary	  for	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  59	  Tomasi,	  FMF,	  p.116.	  60	  Tomasi,	  FMF,	  p.117	  61	  Tomasi,	  FMF,	  p.117.	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supporting	  government	  welfare	  programs	  “needed	  to	  give	  substantive	  value	  to	  citizens’	  rights	  and	  liberties.”62	  
5.	  Status	  v.	  Agency:	  How	  Best	  to	  Approach	  Fairness?	  Tomasi	  claims	  that	  one	  of	  the	  most	  notable	  distinctions	  between	  his	  and	  Rawls’	  theories	  lies	  in	  their	  respective	  interpretations	  of	  the	  ultimate	  goal	  of	  justice.	  Summed	  up	  by	  Tomasi,	  this	  distinction	  can	  be	  understood	  as	  follows:	  “Social	  democracy…interprets	  fairness	  as	  calling	  on	  us	  to	  prefer	  institutions	  that	  respect	  citizens	  as	  freely	  equal”	  whereas	  “market	  democracy,	  by	  contrast,	  emphasizes	  the	  requirement	  that	  we	  seek	  institutions	  that	  treat	  citizens	  as	  equally	  free.”63	  In	  simpler	  terms,	  this	  can	  be	  understood	  as	  a	  distinction	  between	  social	  democrats	  emphasizing	  the	  importance	  of	  status	  while	  market	  democrats	  emphasize	  the	  importance	  of	  agency.	  	  
5.1	  Agency	  	   Agency,	  in	  the	  context	  of	  free	  market	  fairness,	  refers	  to	  the	  capacity	  of	  rational	  citizens	  “to	  realistically	  assess	  the	  options	  before	  them	  and,	  in	  light	  of	  that	  assessment,	  to	  set	  standards	  for	  a	  life	  of	  the	  sort	  that	  each	  deems	  worth	  living.”64	  This	  value	  is	  reflected	  in	  the	  Libertarian	  idea	  of	  self-­‐ownership,	  wherein	  our	  actions	  and	  our	  property	  are	  our	  own,	  and	  as	  a	  result,	  we	  are	  free	  to	  do	  with	  them	  what	  we	  will.65	  So,	  if	  tomorrow	  I	  were	  to	  go	  out	  and	  gamble	  away	  ten	  thousand	  dollars,	  market	  democrats	  would	  view	  this	  as	  an	  instance	  of	  me	  invoking	  my	  agency,	  or	  my	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  62	  Tomasi,	  FMF,	  p.112.	  63	  Tomasi,	  FMF,	  p.193.	  64	  Tomasi,	  FMF,	  p.40.	  65	  Refer	  back	  to	  footnote	  5	  for	  more	  on	  self-­‐ownership.	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right	  as	  a	  rational	  human	  being	  to	  make	  the	  life	  choices	  that	  I	  so	  desire	  without	  interference	  from	  the	  state.	  Although	  many	  would	  likely	  view	  this	  particular	  decision	  as	  rash,	  this	  example	  is	  meant	  only	  to	  show	  that	  by	  having	  my	  agency	  protected,	  I	  am	  permitted	  to	  freely	  make	  decisions	  that	  are	  meaningful	  to	  my	  life	  ambitions,	  even	  if	  others	  do	  not	  value	  these	  choices	  the	  same	  way	  that	  I	  do.	  The	  flipside	  to	  this	  is	  that	  if	  I	  were	  denied	  this	  right	  to	  decide	  for	  myself	  how	  I	  want	  to	  spend	  my	  money,	  my	  time,	  or	  my	  talents,	  then	  on	  Tomasi’s	  account,	  I	  would	  effectively	  be	  stripped	  of	  my	  moral	  powers,	  since	  I	  would	  not	  have	  the	  respect	  of	  my	  fellow	  citizens	  to	  freely	  live	  my	  life	  the	  way	  that	  I	  desire.	  	  Tomasi’s	  market	  democratic	  theory	  goes	  a	  step	  beyond	  simply	  requiring	  that	  we	  protect	  agency.	  Tomasi	  also	  proposes	  that	  the	  best	  way	  to	  promote	  our	  agency	  is	  to	  allow	  inequalities	  in	  social	  primary	  goods	  only	  insofar	  as	  they	  maximize	  the	  worst-­‐off’s	  holdings	  of	  income	  and	  wealth—but	  with	  a	  twist.	  Whereas	  Rawls’	  difference	  principle	  seeks	  to	  maximize	  the	  poorest’s	  holdings	  of	  income	  and	  wealth,	  powers	  and	  prerogatives	  of	  office	  and	  a	  sense	  of	  self-­‐respect,	  Tomasi’s	  market	  democratic	  difference	  principle	  seeks	  only	  to	  maximize	  the	  poorest’s	  holdings	  of	  income	  and	  wealth.	  Tomasi’s	  justification	  for	  leaving	  out	  the	  other	  “DP”	  goods	  is	  explained	  more	  in	  depth	  in	  the	  succeeding	  chapter,	  but	  is	  essentially	  based	  on	  the	  assumption	  that	  income	  and	  wealth	  are	  more	  essential	  then	  are	  the	  other	  DP	  goods	  for	  promoting	  agency.66	  By	  maximizing	  the	  level	  of	  income	  and	  wealth	  obtained	  by	  the	  worst-­‐off,	  Tomasi’s	  market	  democratic	  difference	  principle	  purports	  to	  guarantee	  that	  the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  66	  	  See	  p.60	  section	  3.	  Rivalrous	  DP	  Goods	  (PPO	  v.	  Income	  and	  Wealth)	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worst-­‐off	  have	  the	  freedom	  and	  flexibility	  to	  pursue	  any	  number	  of	  diverse	  life	  plans,	  whether	  it	  be	  buying	  a	  new	  car	  or	  paying	  for	  foreign	  language	  classes.	  Tomasi	  argues	  this	  point	  when	  he	  writes,	  “basic	  rights	  and	  liberties	  in	  place,	  a	  marketized	  interpretation	  [of	  justice	  as	  fairness]…seeks	  to	  maximize	  the	  material	  wealth	  personally	  controlled	  by	  the	  least	  fortunate.	  In	  doing	  so,	  market	  democracy	  hopes	  to	  provide	  such	  people	  with	  the	  largest	  possible	  share	  of	  fuel	  to	  power	  them	  as	  they	  pursue	  their	  diverse	  and	  precious	  plans	  of	  life.”67	  What	  fairness	  requires	  then,	  is	  not	  that	  everyone	  has	  the	  same	  share	  of	  income	  and	  wealth,	  but	  that	  everyone	  has	  the	  same	  opportunity	  to	  use	  that	  income	  and	  wealth	  towards	  their	  respective	  ends,	  and	  in	  so	  doing,	  allow	  their	  agency	  to	  flourish.	  
5.2	  Status	  	   Unlike	  agency,	  status	  is	  a	  relational	  value.	  Our	  status	  is	  dependent	  on	  how	  we	  view	  ourselves	  relative	  to	  other	  members	  of	  society	  and	  how	  others	  view	  us.	  For	  Rawls	  and	  other	  like-­‐minded	  liberals,	  we	  need	  status	  in	  order	  to	  fully	  develop	  our	  moral	  powers	  because	  what	  matters	  in	  developing	  our	  reasonableness	  and	  rationality	  is	  not	  simply	  that	  we	  have	  the	  freedom	  to	  do	  whatever	  we	  like	  whenever	  we	  like	  but	  that	  we	  are	  able	  to	  live	  our	  lives	  as	  free	  and	  equal	  citizens	  in	  relation	  to	  other	  members	  of	  society.	  Because	  seeing	  ourselves	  as	  having	  equal	  status	  with	  others	  greatly	  contributes	  to	  our	  self-­‐respect	  and	  sense	  of	  self-­‐authorship,	  what	  we	  need	  are	  institutions	  and	  basic	  liberties	  that	  guarantee	  not	  only	  our	  right	  to	  freedom,	  but	  also	  our	  right	  to	  equality	  and	  mutual	  respect.	  The	  role	  of	  the	  basic	  liberties	  is	  to	  ensure	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equality	  for	  all	  citizens,	  so	  as	  to	  emphasize	  our	  need	  for	  status.	  As	  Rawls	  puts	  it,	  “In	  a	  well-­‐ordered	  society	  the	  need	  for	  status	  is	  met	  by	  the	  public	  recognition	  of	  just	  institutions,	  together	  with	  the	  full	  and	  diverse	  internal	  life	  of	  the	  many	  free	  communities	  of	  interests	  that	  the	  equal	  liberty	  allows.”	  	  	   It	  is	  worth	  noting	  that	  for	  social	  democrats,	  simply	  increasing	  the	  poorest’s	  holdings	  of	  income	  and	  wealth	  is	  insufficient	  to	  meet	  the	  requirements	  of	  Rawls’	  difference	  principle.68	  This	  is	  because	  what	  Rawls	  theory	  demands	  is	  for	  citizens	  to	  have	  “democratic	  powers	  to	  make	  economic	  decisions,	  including	  democratic	  powers	  of	  control	  over	  productive	  resources”	  and	  not	  individual	  powers	  to	  make	  economic	  decisions.69	  Part	  of	  the	  reason	  Rawls	  and	  other	  like-­‐minded	  liberals	  do	  not	  single	  out	  higher	  incomes	  as	  the	  main	  aim	  of	  the	  difference	  principle,	  is	  because	  they	  are	  skeptical	  about	  the	  significance	  higher	  incomes	  and	  wealth	  have	  on	  expanding	  citizens’	  evaluative	  horizons.	  As	  a	  corollary,	  many	  liberals	  suggests	  that	  once	  some	  minimum	  threshold	  of	  income	  and	  wealth	  has	  been	  met,	  what	  the	  worst-­‐off	  really	  value	  is	  “assurances	  of	  their	  standing	  as	  political	  equals”	  rather	  than	  more	  money.70	  	  
6.	  Summary	  of	  Major	  Differences	  	   In	  summation,	  at	  the	  level	  of	  principled	  justification,	  free	  market	  fairness	  changes	  the	  content	  of	  the	  first	  principle	  of	  justice	  by	  adding	  the	  right	  to	  private	  productive	  property	  and	  the	  right	  to	  negotiate	  one’s	  own	  specific	  terms	  of	  employment	  as	  basic	  rights.	  By	  including	  these	  two	  additional	  liberties	  in	  the	  top	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  68In	  Rawls’	  words,	  “The	  basis	  of	  self-­‐esteem	  in	  a	  just	  society	  is	  not	  then	  one’s	  income	  share	  but	  the	  publicly	  affirmed	  distribution	  of	  fundamental	  rights	  and	  liberties.”	  (Rawls,	  TJ,	  p.544.	  Italics	  added	  for	  emphasis).	  69	  Tomasi,	  FMF,	  p.188.	  70	  Tomasi,	  FMF,	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tier	  of	  primary	  goods,	  Tomasi’s	  interpretation	  of	  Rawls’	  first	  principle	  of	  justice,	  now	  demands	  that	  we	  consider	  these	  economic	  liberties	  as	  on	  par	  with	  the	  political	  liberties	  and	  liberty	  of	  conscience	  and	  as	  prior	  to	  the	  other	  two	  tiers	  of	  primary	  goods.	  The	  second	  alteration	  Tomasi	  makes	  to	  Rawls’	  view	  is	  in	  changing	  the	  requirements	  of	  the	  difference	  principle.	  Tomasi’s	  market	  democratic	  difference	  principle	  is	  distinct	  from	  Rawls’	  difference	  principle	  because	  it	  aims	  at	  maximizing	  only	  the	  poorest’s	  holding	  of	  income	  and	  wealth,	  as	  opposed	  to	  maximizing	  the	  poorest’s	  holdings	  of	  powers	  and	  prerogatives	  of	  office	  and	  self-­‐respect	  as	  well.	  Tomasi	  justifies	  this	  alteration	  on	  the	  grounds	  that	  his	  market	  democratic	  difference	  principle	  more	  accurately	  reflects	  what	  individual’s	  would	  desire	  once	  their	  basic	  rights	  have	  already	  been	  secured	  and	  fair	  equality	  of	  opportunity	  has	  already	  been	  satisfied.	  With	  these	  two	  higher-­‐order	  interests	  guaranteed,	  Tomasi	  thinks	  that	  individuals	  would	  necessarily	  prioritize	  agency	  and	  by	  extension,	  income	  and	  wealth	  over	  status	  and	  the	  other	  two	  DP	  goods.	  Due	  to	  the	  changes	  made	  to	  the	  content	  of	  the	  first	  principle	  of	  justice	  and	  the	  altered	  requirement	  of	  the	  difference	  principle,	  the	  institutional	  requirements	  of	  free	  market	  fairness	  are	  likewise	  distinct	  from	  Rawls’	  original	  recommendations.	  Whereas	  Rawls	  favored	  property-­‐owning	  democracies	  and	  liberal	  democratic	  socialism,	  Tomasi	  favors	  democratic	  laissez-­‐faire	  and	  democratic	  limited	  government,	  since	  these	  regime	  types	  are	  more	  sensitive	  to	  economic	  freedom	  and	  growth.	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Chapter	  3.	  
The	  Not-­‐so-­‐Basic,	  Basic	  Economic	  Liberties:	  	  
Defending	  the	  First	  Principle	  of	  Justice	  
	  “In	  a	  democracy,	  the	  professed	  equality	  of	  rights	  of	  all	  citizens	  contrasts	  sharply	  with	  the	  very	  real	  inequality	  of	  living	  conditions,	  and	  in	  order	  to	  overcome	  this	  contradiction	  it	  is	  vital	  to	  make	  sure	  that	  social	  inequalities	  derive	  from	  rational	  and	  universal	  principles	  rather	  than	  arbitrary	  contingencies.”	  -­‐	  Thomas	  Piketty,	  Capital	  in	  the	  Twenty-­‐First	  Century	  
	  
1.	  Introduction	  In	  this	  chapter	  I	  will	  assess	  the	  content	  changes	  that	  Tomasi	  proposes	  to	  the	  first	  principle	  of	  justice.	  In	  particular,	  I	  will	  challenge	  Tomasi’s	  claim	  that	  the	  economic	  liberties	  are	  basic	  in	  the	  same	  way	  as	  are	  Rawls’	  other	  basic	  liberties;	  since,	  Tomasi’s	  economic	  liberties	  are	  not	  necessary	  for	  individuals	  to	  develop	  their	  two	  moral	  powers	  of	  reasonableness	  and	  rationality.	  Following	  this,	  I	  will	  propose	  a	  Tomasian	  response	  to	  this	  objection	  which	  suggests	  that	  freedom	  of	  economic	  contract	  and	  private	  productive	  property	  ownership	  are	  in	  fact	  necessary	  for	  some	  individuals	  to	  develop	  their	  capacity	  as	  rational	  self-­‐authors	  and	  therefore	  ought	  to	  be	  deemed	  basic.	  In	  response,	  I	  will	  point	  out	  that	  this	  line	  of	  argument	  fails	  because,	  for	  a	  liberty	  to	  be	  basic,	  it	  needs	  not	  only	  to	  be	  essential	  for	  the	  development	  of	  one	  or	  both	  moral	  powers	  but	  also,	  general	  across	  all	  citizens.	  Because	  Tomasi’s	  liberties	  do	  not	  meet	  the	  generality	  condition	  I	  will	  conclude	  that	  the	  economic	  liberties	  are	  not	  basic.	  To	  say	  this	  is	  not	  to	  deny	  that	  Tomasi’s	  economic	  liberties	  are	  important	  and	  even	  necessary	  for	  certain	  individuals	  to	  satisfy	  their	  third	  fundamental	  interest	  of	  pursuing	  a	  particular	  conception	  of	  the	  good	  life.	  But	  basic	  liberties	  are	  only	  concerned	  with	  satisfying	  the	  two	  fundamental	  interests	  of	  reasonableness	  and	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rationality	  and	  not	  the	  third	  fundamental	  interest	  of	  pursuing	  a	  particular	  conception	  of	  the	  good.	  	  From	  this,	  I	  will	  conclude	  that	  even	  though	  private	  productive	  property	  ownership	  and	  freedom	  of	  economic	  contract	  may	  allow	  some	  individuals	  to	  satisfy	  their	  third	  fundamental	  interest,	  this	  is	  not	  sufficient	  for	  us	  to	  grant	  freedom	  of	  economic	  contract	  and	  the	  right	  to	  private	  productive	  property	  ownership	  basic	  rights	  status.	  	  
2.	  Why	  the	  Economic	  Liberties	  Aren’t	  Basic	  	   The	  rights	  Rawls	  classifies	  as	  “basic”	  are	  those	  that	  meet	  the	  “essential	  social	  conditions	  for	  the	  adequate	  development	  and	  full	  exercise	  of	  the	  two	  powers	  of	  moral	  personality	  over	  a	  complete	  life."71	  As	  a	  reminder	  to	  the	  reader,	  these	  moral	  powers	  refer	  to	  reasonableness,	  or	  our	  capacity	  for	  a	  sense	  of	  justice,	  and	  rationality,	  which	  is	  our	  ability	  to	  form,	  revise	  and	  pursue	  a	  conception	  of	  the	  good.	  	  In	  direct	  denial	  of	  Rawls’	  claim	  that	  “the	  right	  to	  private	  property	  in	  natural	  resources	  and	  means	  of	  production…including	  rights	  of	  acquisition	  and	  bequest”	  are	  not	  essential	  for	  developing	  the	  two	  moral	  powers,	  Tomasi	  holds	  as	  a	  main	  tenet	  of	  his	  theory	  that	  these	  economic	  liberties	  are	  in	  fact	  essential	  for	  the	  development	  of	  the	  two	  moral	  powers	  and,	  for	  this	  reason,	  ought	  to	  be	  deemed	  basic.72	  In	  this	  section	  I	  will	  set	  out	  to	  clarify	  why	  it	  is	  that	  Rawls	  purposefully	  excludes	  the	  economic	  liberties	  from	  his	  list	  of	  basic	  liberties.	  I	  will	  then	  explain	  why	  Tomasi	  rejects	  this	  argument	  and	  lastly	  I	  will	  end	  by	  suggesting	  that	  Tomasi’s	  justification	  for	  making	  the	  economic	  liberties	  basic	  is	  flawed.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  71	  Rawls,	  John.	  Political	  Liberalism.	  New	  York:	  Columbia	  UP,	  1993.	  p.293.	  Print.	  	  72	  Rawls,	  JAF,	  p.114.	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2.1	  Rawls’	  Criteria	  for	  Basic	  Liberties	  Discriminating	  amongst	  his	  own	  list	  of	  basic	  liberties,	  Rawls	  argues	  that	  the	  equal	  political	  liberties	  and	  freedom	  of	  thought	  are	  essential	  for	  citizens	  to	  develop	  their	  moral	  power	  of	  reasonableness,	  since	  they	  both	  “enable	  citizens	  to	  develop	  and	  to	  exercise	  [their	  moral	  powers]	  in	  judging	  the	  justice	  of	  the	  basic	  structure	  of	  society	  and	  its	  social	  policies.”73	  They	  perform	  this	  role	  by	  ensuring	  that	  citizens	  do	  not	  have	  to	  rely	  on	  others	  to	  protect	  their	  rights	  and	  political	  interests,	  but	  instead	  have,	  as	  a	  constitutional	  guarantee,	  the	  freedom	  to	  think	  and	  debate	  for	  themselves	  about	  issues	  concerning	  justice.	  For	  example,	  by	  having	  my	  right	  to	  vote	  guaranteed	  as	  part	  of	  the	  basic	  political	  liberties,	  I	  will	  always	  be	  able	  to	  voice	  my	  opinions	  on	  which	  laws	  I	  think	  are	  just	  and	  unjust	  and	  which	  politicians	  I	  think	  will	  best	  promote	  my	  interests.	  Similarly,	  liberty	  of	  conscience	  and	  freedom	  of	  association	  are	  critical	  for	  citizens	  to	  develop	  their	  rational	  capacity,	  since	  they	  “enable	  citizens	  to	  develop	  and	  exercise	  their	  moral	  powers	  in	  forming	  and	  revising	  and	  in	  rationally	  pursuing…their	  conceptions	  of	  the	  good.”74	  For	  example,	  by	  establishing	  liberty	  of	  conscience	  and	  freedom	  of	  association	  as	  constitutional	  essentials	  I	  will	  always	  be	  free	  to	  pursue	  any	  number	  of	  conceptions	  of	  the	  good,	  which	  allow	  me	  to	  live	  a	  full	  and	  meaningful	  life;	  whether	  that	  be,	  by	  meditating,	  perhaps	  with	  others,	  on	  the	  works	  of	  some	  particular	  religion	  or	  by	  subscribing	  to	  many	  different	  philosophical	  doctrines	  throughout	  the	  course	  of	  my	  lifetime.	  	   One	  important	  nuance	  of	  Rawls’	  theory	  is	  that	  not	  all	  of	  the	  basic	  liberties	  need	  to	  be	  directly	  involved	  with	  the	  development	  of	  the	  two	  moral	  powers.	  For	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  73	  Rawls,	  JAF,	  p.45.	  74	  Rawls,	  JAF,	  p.45.	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example,	  neither,	  freedom	  and	  integrity	  of	  the	  person,	  nor	  the	  rule	  of	  the	  law	  directly	  affect	  our	  capacity	  as	  reasonable	  or	  rational	  citizens.	  However,	  both	  of	  these	  liberties	  are	  still	  considered	  basic	  because	  they	  are	  “supporting	  liberties,”	  needed	  to	  appropriately	  enforce	  the	  other	  basic	  liberties.75	  	  	   2.2	  Tomasi	  Justifies	  the	  Economic	  Liberties	  In	  Free	  Market	  Fairness,	  Tomasi	  argues	  that	  the	  economic	  liberties	  are	  basic	  precisely	  for	  the	  same	  reason	  that	  Rawls’	  liberties	  are:	  because	  they	  enhance	  the	  moral	  powers	  of	  citizens.	  For	  Tomasi,	  the	  economic	  liberties	  are	  basic	  because	  “with	  prosperity,	  the	  exercise	  of	  thick	  private	  economic	  liberty	  is	  for	  many	  citizens	  an	  essential	  condition	  of	  responsible	  self-­‐authorship.”76	  So,	  by	  ensuring	  that	  individuals	  have	  their	  economic	  liberties	  guaranteed,	  citizens	  will	  be	  better	  able	  to	  exercise	  their	  agency	  and	  in	  so	  doing,	  their	  ability	  to	  develop	  a	  sense	  of	  justice	  and	  pursue	  a	  conception	  of	  the	  good.	  	  In	  the	  subsequent	  section	  I	  will	  argue	  that	  Tomasi	  misses	  out	  on	  a	  key	  distinction	  between	  Rawls’	  basic	  liberties	  and	  his	  own	  two	  liberties	  of	  the	  right	  to	  private	  ownership	  of	  the	  means	  of	  production	  and	  freedom	  of	  economic	  contract.	  Namely,	  basic	  liberties	  must	  be	  suitably	  general	  so	  as	  to	  apply	  to	  all	  reasonable	  and	  rational	  citizens	  and	  not	  merely	  to	  some	  unique	  subset	  of	  citizens.	  
2.3	  The	  Generality	  Condition	  	   For	  a	  liberty	  to	  be	  basic	  it	  must	  be	  the	  case	  that	  it	  significantly	  contributes	  to	  the	  protection	  of	  the	  two	  moral	  powers	  for	  all	  citizens	  and	  not	  just	  some.	  The	  reason	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  75	  Rawls,	  JAF,	  p.113.	  76	  Tomasi,	  FMF,	  p.183.	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Rawls	  requires	  this	  generality	  condition	  in	  deciding	  which	  liberties	  are	  basic	  is	  twofold.	  First,	  requiring	  that	  all	  basic	  rights	  be	  general	  resolves	  the	  problem	  of	  indeterminate	  values;	  such	  that,	  what	  individuals	  value	  before	  they	  go	  behind	  the	  veil	  of	  ignorance	  has	  the	  potential	  to	  be	  entirely	  different	  from,	  or	  even	  come	  into	  conflict	  with,	  what	  they	  value	  once	  the	  basic	  structure	  of	  society	  has	  been	  remodeled.	  However,	  if	  a	  right	  is	  general	  it	  will	  be	  valued	  no	  matter	  what	  the	  basic	  structure	  of	  society	  turns	  out	  to	  be.77	  Applying	  this	  to	  Rawls’	  basic	  liberties,	  it	  will	  never	  be	  the	  case	  that	  someone	  thinks	  they	  care	  about	  liberty	  of	  conscience	  behind	  the	  veil	  of	  ignorance	  but	  then	  it	  turns	  out	  they	  do	  not	  when	  they	  come	  out	  from	  behind	  the	  veil,	  because	  liberty	  of	  conscience,	  or	  having	  the	  freedom	  to	  follow	  some	  ethical	  or	  religious	  belief,	  is	  constitutive	  of	  living	  a	  reasonable	  life.	  Conversely,	  some	  alternative	  value	  such	  as	  having	  the	  right	  to	  hunt	  freely	  wherever	  you	  like	  would	  not	  be	  deemed	  basic	  because	  if	  it	  turned	  out	  that	  you	  highly	  valued	  animal	  rights	  when	  you	  came	  out	  from	  behind	  the	  veil	  of	  ignorance	  you	  would	  no	  longer	  wish	  for	  this	  right	  to	  be	  a	  constitutional	  essential.	  Second,	  requiring	  that	  all	  basic	  rights	  be	  general	  prevents	  assessments	  of	  significance	  about	  which	  liberties	  ought	  to	  be	  included	  in	  the	  set	  of	  basic	  liberties	  from	  becoming	  citizen	  specific.78	  	  For	  example,	  if	  someone	  were	  to	  try	  to	  write	  in	  the	  constitution	  a	  law	  decreeing	  that,	  “Forthwith,	  no	  one	  shall	  work	  on	  Sundays,	  as	  Sunday	  is	  the	  Lord’s	  day,	  and	  must	  be	  maintained	  as	  a	  day	  of	  rest”	  this	  would	  be	  highly	  controversial	  since	  although	  it	  is	  recognized	  as	  a	  tenet	  of	  the	  Christian	  faith,	  it	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  Pogge,	  JR,	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  78	  Pogge,	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stands	  in	  stark	  contrast	  to	  the	  Quran,	  of	  Islamic	  faith,	  which	  reads,	  "When	  the	  call	  is	  proclaimed	  to	  prayer	  on	  Friday,	  hasten	  earnestly	  to	  the	  Remembrance	  of	  Allah,	  and	  leave	  off	  business.”79	  If	  the	  third	  fundamental	  interest	  were	  included	  in	  our	  assessments	  of	  significance,	  then	  determining	  to	  what	  extent	  the	  right	  to	  ban	  work	  on	  Sundays	  ought	  to	  be	  basic	  becomes	  unclear,	  since	  it	  may	  be	  of	  great	  significance	  for	  Christians	  but	  not	  for	  Muslims	  and	  other	  non-­‐Christians.	  This	  in	  turn	  leads	  to	  the	  worry	  that	  if	  the	  list	  of	  basic	  liberties	  is	  to	  fully	  protect	  not	  only	  the	  exercise	  and	  development	  of	  reasonableness	  and	  rationality	  but	  the	  development	  of	  the	  third	  fundamental	  interest	  as	  well,	  then	  the	  list	  of	  basic	  rights	  would	  have	  to	  include	  rights	  reflective	  of	  an	  infinite	  number	  of	  unique	  conceptions	  of	  the	  good.80	  Since	  it	  would	  be	  impossible	  to	  account	  for	  all	  citizens’	  individual	  conceptions	  of	  the	  good	  in	  generating	  the	  full	  list	  of	  basic	  liberties,	  it	  follows	  that	  in	  this	  case	  too,	  a	  law	  is	  only	  basic	  if	  it	  is	  sufficiently	  general	  so	  that	  all	  reasonable	  citizens	  deem	  it	  as	  essential.	  
3.	  Why	  the	  Economic	  Liberties	  Are	  Not	  General	  Applying	  this	  generality	  condition	  to	  Tomasi’s	  economic	  liberties	  we	  can	  now	  see	  why	  freedom	  of	  economic	  contract	  and	  ownership	  of	  private	  productive	  property	  do	  not	  meet	  this	  condition	  for	  being	  basic.	  In	  regards	  to	  the	  problem	  of	  indeterminate	  values,	  Tomasi	  may	  be	  right	  to	  presume	  that	  some	  individuals	  would	  prefer	  having	  a	  right	  to	  private	  productive	  property	  ownership	  before	  going	  behind	  the	  veil	  of	  ignorance,	  however,	  if	  these	  citizens	  then	  discovered	  that	  what	  they	  value	  when	  the	  veil	  of	  ignorance	  gets	  lifted	  is	  living	  and	  working	  communally	  with	  their	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  Khalifa,	  Rashad.	  Quran:	  The	  Final	  Testament.	  Fremont,	  CA:	  Universal	  Unity,	  Surah	  62.9	  Al-­‐Jamu'a.	  2000.	  Print.	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neighbors,	  then	  the	  significance	  they	  grant	  to	  private	  holdings	  of	  productive	  property,	  and	  by	  extension	  income	  and	  wealth,	  would	  diminish.	  	  	   Similarly,	  just	  as	  the	  law	  prohibiting	  work	  on	  Sundays	  did	  not	  constitute	  a	  basic	  right	  because	  it	  was	  significant	  only	  in	  virtue	  of	  satisfying	  the	  third	  fundamental	  interest	  of	  Christians,	  so	  too	  should	  Tomasi’s	  liberties	  not	  be	  considered	  basic	  because	  they	  also	  are	  only	  significant	  of	  some	  citizens’	  third	  fundamental	  interest.	  	  For	  example,	  the	  right	  to	  private	  ownership	  of	  the	  means	  of	  production	  may	  be	  valuable	  for	  Amy	  of	  Amy’s	  Pup-­‐In-­‐a-­‐Tub	  but	  someone	  happily	  working	  in	  a	  trade	  union	  would	  have	  no	  reason	  to	  deem	  private	  productive	  property	  ownership	  an	  essential	  condition	  for	  living	  a	  valuable	  life.	  As	  Samuel	  Freeman	  puts	  it	  “a	  claim	  that	  all	  persons	  must	  exercise	  thick	  economic	  liberties	  for	  their	  self-­‐authorship	  is	  false,	  since	  most	  people	  who	  effectively	  author	  their	  own	  lives	  do	  quite	  well	  without	  being	  entrepreneurs	  or	  owning	  and	  extensively	  controlling	  productive	  property.”81	  	  Likewise,	  the	  right	  to	  negotiate	  the	  terms	  of	  employment	  is	  not	  a	  shared	  value	  between	  all	  citizens	  since	  those	  who	  work	  in	  trade	  unions	  standardly	  negotiate	  better	  contracts	  when	  negotiating	  with	  their	  union	  rather	  than	  on	  their	  own.82	  So,	  even	  if	  Tomasi	  is	  right	  to	  assume	  that	  more	  robust	  economic	  freedoms	  are	  necessary	  for	  some	  people	  to	  satisfy	  their	  third	  fundamental	  interest,	  it	  does	  not	  follow	  that	  these	  rights	  ought	  to	  automatically	  be	  deemed	  basic	  since	  they	  are	  not	  necessary	  for	  the	  full-­‐development	  of	  all	  citizens’	  moral	  powers.	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4.	  Tomasi	  Fires	  Back	  Tomasi	  pushes	  back	  against	  this	  objection	  by	  arguing	  that	  while	  the	  economic	  liberties	  may	  at	  first	  glance	  appear	  not	  to	  be	  necessary	  for	  the	  development	  of	  the	  two	  moral	  powers	  of	  all	  citizens,	  upon	  closer	  inspection,	  it	  turns	  out	  they	  are.83	  To	  help	  illustrate	  this	  point	  Tomasi	  uses	  the	  following	  example	  of	  Terry	  and	  Tom	  to	  show	  that	  the	  basic	  political	  liberties	  can	  also,	  on	  occasion,	  operate	  in	  this	  non-­‐obvious	  way,	  but	  this	  does	  not	  mean	  that	  we	  should	  think	  them	  any	  less	  basic.	  For	  Terry,	  involvement	  in	  political	  organization	  and	  campaigning	  is	  essential	  for	  his	  self-­‐authorship,	  whereas	  Tom	  hates	  all	  things	  political	  and	  steers	  as	  far	  away	  from	  the	  campaign	  trail	  as	  he	  possibly	  can.	  	  Although	  both	  Terry	  and	  Tom	  differ	  in	  how	  they	  experience	  political	  liberty,	  it	  does	  not	  follow	  that	  political	  liberty	  is	  necessary	  only	  for	  Terry	  and	  not	  for	  Tom.	  Rather,	  what	  matters,	  Tomasi	  says,	  is	  that	  both	  Terry	  and	  Tom	  have	  the	  option	  to	  pursue	  their	  different	  life	  plans	  in	  a	  meaningful	  way,	  so	  long	  as	  pursuing	  these	  life	  plans	  does	  not	  conflict	  with	  the	  life	  plans	  (and	  basic	  rights)	  of	  others.	  In	  this	  sense,	  the	  political	  liberties	  are	  general	  simply	  because	  they	  allow	  Terry	  the	  positive	  freedom	  of	  opting-­‐in	  to	  political	  activism	  and	  Tom	  the	  freedom	  of	  opting-­‐out	  of	  it.	  Tomasi	  takes	  this	  to	  mean	  that	  the	  political	  liberties	  are	  general	  simply	  because	  they	  expand	  the	  options	  available	  to	  all	  citizens,	  “which	  scheme	  is	  compatible	  with	  the	  same	  scheme	  of	  liberties	  for	  all.”84	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  "Reply	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Applying	  this	  reasoning	  to	  his	  own	  economic	  liberties,	  Tomasi	  claims	  that	  his	  rights	  can	  likewise	  be	  viewed	  as	  essential	  for	  the	  moral	  development	  of	  all	  citizens,	  on	  closer	  inspection.	  For,	  without	  the	  freedom	  to	  choose	  between	  a	  wide	  variety	  of	  ownership	  schemes,	  including	  private	  ownership	  of	  the	  means	  of	  production,	  as	  well	  as	  public	  ownership,	  “citizens	  are	  vulnerable	  to	  having	  others	  use	  state	  power	  to	  impose	  some	  ownership	  configuration	  upon	  them.”85	  Similarly,	  excluding	  freedom	  of	  economic	  contract	  from	  the	  list	  of	  basic	  liberties	  also	  limits	  the	  ways	  in	  which	  a	  citizen	  can	  negotiate	  the	  terms	  of	  their	  contracts.	  By	  omitting	  the	  economic	  liberties	  from	  the	  list	  of	  basic	  liberties,	  the	  opportunities	  of	  citizens	  who	  value	  these	  liberties	  are	  limited	  since	  people	  like	  Amy	  of	  Amy’s	  Pup-­‐In-­‐A-­‐Tub	  can	  no	  longer	  opt-­‐in	  to	  being	  the	  sole	  source	  of	  their	  economic	  security.	  Because	  this	  is	  so,	  Tomasi	  concludes,	  “a	  scheme	  of	  basic	  liberties	  that	  makes	  a	  wide	  range	  of	  ownership	  configurations	  formally	  available	  to	  citizens…better	  expresses	  our	  commitment	  to	  respect	  citizens	  as	  responsible	  authors	  of	  their	  own	  lives;”	  and	  so,	  the	  economic	  liberties	  ought	  to	  be	  deemed	  basic.86	  
5.	  Responding	  to	  Tomasi	  	   While	  Tomasi	  is	  right	  to	  say	  that	  exclusion	  of	  the	  economic	  liberties	  from	  the	  top	  tier	  of	  basic	  liberties	  limits	  the	  ownership	  configurations	  and	  contract	  options	  available	  to	  citizens,	  I	  disagree	  with	  his	  contention	  that	  all	  citizens	  need	  the	  widest	  array	  of	  ownership	  and	  contract	  schemes	  possible	  in	  order	  to	  fully	  develop	  their	  moral	  powers.	  This	  is	  because	  limiting	  the	  ownership	  and	  contract	  schemes	  available	  to	  citizens	  does	  not	  harm	  their	  ability	  to	  live	  reasonable	  and	  rational	  lives	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  Reply	  to	  Samuel	  Freeman.	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whereas	  limiting	  Rawls’	  basic	  liberties	  does.	  If	  the	  right	  to	  private	  productive	  property	  ownership	  were	  not	  protected	  as	  a	  basic	  liberty,	  all	  citizens,	  including	  those	  who	  valued	  these	  economic	  liberties,	  would	  still	  be	  able	  to	  earn	  their	  livings	  doing	  meaningful	  work,	  they	  would	  still	  be	  able	  to	  develop	  a	  sense	  of	  justice	  by	  voting	  and	  entering	  into	  public	  dialogue	  with	  their	  fellow	  citizens	  and	  they	  would	  still	  be	  able	  to	  formulate	  a	  conception	  of	  the	  good	  by	  subscribing	  to	  some	  religion	  or	  ethical	  value	  system.	  Contrast	  this	  outcome	  with	  the	  restriction	  of	  Rawls’	  basic	  liberties.	  If	  the	  political	  liberties	  were	  not	  included	  in	  the	  list	  of	  basic	  liberties	  then	  this	  would	  impose	  an	  impermissible	  restriction	  on	  all	  citizens’	  moral	  powers,	  
including	  Tom’s,	  since	  without	  the	  protection	  of	  freedom	  of	  thought,	  citizens	  could	  find	  themselves	  living	  in	  an	  Orwellian-­‐like	  state,	  rampant	  with	  censorship	  and	  privacy	  violations,	  which	  would	  make	  exercising	  the	  moral	  powers	  impossible.	  As	  was	  noted	  earlier,	  Rawls’	  generality	  condition	  is	  not	  meant	  to	  suggest	  that	  
everything	  that	  is	  important	  to	  individuals	  ought	  to	  be	  included	  in	  the	  list	  of	  basic	  liberties.	  For	  this	  would	  mean	  that	  hundreds	  of	  additional	  rights	  would	  need	  to	  be	  added	  to	  the	  list	  of	  basic	  liberties	  in	  the	  hopes	  of	  even	  further	  expanding	  the	  array	  of	  options	  available	  to	  citizens.87	  Instead,	  a	  proper	  interpretation	  of	  the	  generality	  condition	  means	  that	  a	  right	  is	  basic	  if	  it	  is	  needed	  to	  protect	  and	  ensure	  the	  development	  of	  the	  moral	  powers	  for	  all	  citizens.	  Whereas	  someone	  who	  values	  economic	  decision-­‐making	  can	  still	  live	  a	  full	  and	  meaningful	  life	  without	  having	  their	  economic	  liberties	  guaranteed,	  this	  is	  not	  the	  case	  with	  Rawls’	  other	  basic	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liberties.	  Without	  the	  protection	  of	  Rawls’	  basic	  liberties	  the	  harm	  imposed	  on	  all	  members	  of	  society	  would	  be	  great.	  Despite	  Tomasi’s	  claim	  to	  the	  contrary,	  it	  seems	  that	  his	  economic	  liberties	  are	  only	  reflective	  of	  a	  third	  fundamental	  interest,	  for	  which	  only	  a	  small	  subset	  of	  the	  population	  has	  a	  stake	  claimed.	  Moreover,	  the	  Terry	  and	  Tom	  example	  Tomasi	  uses	  to	  show	  that	  the	  economic	  liberties	  are	  as	  basic	  as	  the	  political	  liberties	  fails	  because	  whereas	  the	  political	  liberties	  are	  necessary	  to	  ensure	  that	  all	  citizens	  are	  able	  to	  develop	  and	  exercise	  their	  moral	  powers,	  the	  economic	  liberties	  are	  only	  important	  in	  the	  third-­‐fundamental	  interest	  sense.	  	  
6.	  Continuing	  the	  Debate:	  Is	  Generality	  Really	  Necessary?	  Although	  Tomasi’s	  economic	  liberties	  may	  not	  satisfy	  Rawls’	  generality	  criterion,	  we	  may	  wonder	  whether	  or	  not	  Rawls	  is	  right	  to	  make	  generality	  a	  necessary	  condition	  of	  basic	  rights.	  	  One	  reason	  to	  worry	  about	  this	  is	  that	  certain	  rights	  and	  liberties	  may	  be	  of	  extreme	  importance	  to	  the	  majority	  of	  society	  even	  if	  they	  are	  not	  significant	  or	  important	  to	  all	  members	  of	  society.	  Take	  for	  example	  the	  case	  of	  reproductive	  rights.	  Extending	  freedom	  and	  integrity	  of	  the	  person	  to	  include	  affording	  rape	  victims	  the	  right	  to	  an	  abortion	  may	  be	  extremely	  important	  for	  women	  to	  fully	  exercise	  and	  develop	  their	  two	  moral	  powers.	  However,	  this	  particular	  right	  is	  of	  little	  to	  no	  significance	  for	  men	  because	  men	  cannot	  themselves	  have	  an	  abortion	  and	  only	  some	  men	  have	  wives,	  daughters	  or	  close	  female	  friends	  who’s	  need	  to	  get	  an	  abortion	  would	  significantly	  affect	  their	  lives.88	  Because	  on	  Rawls’	  account	  we	  do	  not	  know	  essential	  features	  about	  ourselves	  behind	  the	  veil	  of	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  JR,	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ignorance,	  including	  our	  gender,	  we	  would	  not	  grant	  reproductive	  rights	  basic	  status,	  even	  though	  women,	  who	  account	  for	  more	  than	  half	  of	  society	  may	  prefer	  to	  have	  this	  freedom	  granted	  to	  them	  once	  the	  veil	  has	  been	  lifted.	  Another	  criticism	  of	  Rawls’	  generality	  condition	  is	  that	  even	  if	  a	  right	  is	  only	  significant	  for	  some	  minority	  group,	  the	  minority	  group	  may	  be	  more	  interested	  in	  having	  this	  right	  guaranteed	  over	  some	  of	  the	  other	  basic	  rights.	  For	  example,	  those	  with	  severe	  medical	  disabilities	  would	  likely	  be	  more	  concerned	  with	  having	  reliable	  access	  to	  medical	  treatment	  than	  having	  the	  right	  to	  hold	  public	  office	  guaranteed	  to	  them.	  However,	  as	  Martha	  Nussbaum	  explains	  in	  her	  book,	  Frontiers	  of	  Justice:	  Disability,	  Nationality,	  Species	  Membership,	  this	  right	  would	  not	  be	  guaranteed	  as	  a	  constitutional	  essential	  on	  Rawls’	  account	  because	  those	  behind	  the	  veil	  of	  ignorance	  are	  self-­‐interested,	  and	  rational	  parties	  who	  deliberate	  about	  what	  justice	  requires	  without	  serious	  philanthropic	  or	  altruistic	  motivations.	  Because	  those	  in	  the	  original	  position	  are	  concerned	  only	  with	  their	  individual	  advantage	  and	  the	  mutual	  advantage	  that	  they	  can	  gain	  through	  fair	  cooperation	  with	  others,	  they	  would	  see	  no	  obvious	  benefit	  in	  cooperating	  with	  the	  severely	  disabled,	  and	  therefore	  they	  would	  not	  seek	  principles	  of	  justice	  that	  explicitly	  meet	  the	  needs	  of	  the	  severely	  disabled.89	  
6.1 Why	  Generality	  Is	  Really	  Necessary	  Despite	  these	  very	  real	  apprehensions,	  Rawls	  may	  still	  be	  perfectly	  justified	  in	  requiring	  that	  the	  basic	  liberties	  be	  general.	  This	  is	  because	  in	  establishing	  his	  theory,	  Rawls	  was	  not	  concerned	  with	  creating	  a	  society	  that	  satisfies	  the	  myriad	  of	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  Martha	  Craven.	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  of	  Justice:	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  Species	  Membership.	  Cambridge,	  MA:	  Belknap,	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individuals’	  specific,	  and	  often	  conflicting,	  interests;	  but	  rather,	  “to	  establish	  the	  principles	  of	  background	  justice	  for	  the	  basic	  structure	  of	  society.”	  In	  limiting	  the	  scope	  of	  his	  claim	  to	  establishing	  the	  basic	  structure	  of	  society	  and	  not	  all	  societal	  institutions	  and	  principles,	  Rawls	  is	  not	  claiming	  that	  these	  gender	  based	  concerns	  and	  concerns	  about	  disabilities	  are	  less	  morally	  important	  than	  are	  the	  basic	  principles	  of	  justice.	  Instead,	  he	  is	  merely	  arguing	  that	  these	  concerns	  would	  be	  better	  resolved	  at	  the	  remedial	  level,	  with	  interest-­‐specific	  institutions,	  once	  the	  basic	  structure	  and	  institutions	  governing	  society	  have	  already	  been	  established.90	  Thus,	  since	  generality	  really	  is	  a	  necessary	  condition	  of	  basic	  liberties	  and	  since	  Tomasi’s	  economic	  liberties	  are	  not	  essential	  for	  the	  moral	  development	  of	  the	  general	  populace,	  the	  economic	  liberties	  are	  not	  in	  fact	  basic	  in	  the	  crucial	  Rawlsian	  sense.	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Chapter	  4.	  
Tomasi’s	  Difference	  Principle:	  Too	  Different?	  
Defending	  the	  Second	  Principle	  of	  Justice	  
	  “The	  outstanding	   faults	  of	   the	   economic	   system	   in	  which	  we	   live	   are	   its	   failure	   to	  provide	  for	  full	  employment	  and	  its	  arbitrary	  and	  inequitable	  distribution	  of	  wealth	  and	  income.”	   -­‐	  John	  Maynard	  Keynes,	  The	  General	  Theory	  of	  
Employment,	  Interest	  and	  Money	  
1.	  Introduction	  I	  will	  now	  move	  on	  to	  consider	  how	  Tomasi’s	  proposed	  changes	  to	  Rawls’	  first	  principle	  of	  justice	  threaten	  the	  effectiveness	  of	  the	  second	  principle	  of	  justice.	  I	  will	  begin	  by	  showing	  that	  if	  one	  were	  to	  grant	  the	  economic	  liberties	  basic	  status,	  this	  would	  have	  the	  undesirable	  consequence	  of	  impinging	  on	  society’s	  ability	  to	  maximize	  the	  position	  of	  the	  worst-­‐off,	  due	  to	  the	  priority	  granted	  to	  the	  first	  principle	  of	  justice	  over	  the	  second.	  If	  Tomasi’s	  interpretation	  is	  to	  stay	  true	  to	  Rawls’	  theoretical	  framework,	  then	  society	  must	  aim	  at	  satisfying	  the	  basic	  liberties	  (including	  the	  economic	  liberties)	  first,	  before	  moving	  on	  to	  satisfy	  any	  distributional	  concerns	  falling	  under	  the	  jurisdiction	  of	  fair	  equality	  of	  opportunity	  or	  the	  difference	  principle.	  	  This	  is	  worrisome	  because	  once	  freedom	  of	  economic	  contract	  is	  established	  as	  a	  constitutional	  essential,	  then	  attempts	  by	  the	  state	  to	  outlaw	  certain	  contracts	  would	  seemingly	  be	  impermissible,	  even	  if	  said	  contracts	  were	  signed	  under	  conditions	  of	  unfair	  duress	  caused	  by	  employers	  holding	  disproportionate	  bargaining	  power	  over	  their	  would-­‐be	  employees.	  Similarly,	  there	  is	  a	  worry	  that	  if	  private-­‐productive-­‐property	  ownership	  is	  made	  a	  constitutional	  guarantee,	  then	  this	  may	  further	  increase	  the	  scarcity	  of	  property	  available	  to	  non-­‐property	  owners.	  However,	  in	  response	  to	  this	  second	  objection	  I	  will	  concede	  to	  Tomasi	  that	  in	  some	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instances,	  it	  may	  be	  to	  the	  benefit	  of	  the	  worst-­‐off	  to	  have	  only	  a	  small	  elite	  control	  the	  means	  of	  production.	  So,	  while	  Tomasi	  may	  escape	  the	  productive	  property	  ownership	  objection,	  he	  does	  not	  escape	  the	  freedom	  of	  contract	  concern.	  	  	  Following	  this	  I	  will	  present	  a	  family	  of	  objections	  that	  reject	  Tomasi’s	  interpretation	  of	  the	  relationship	  between	  the	  various	  difference	  principle	  (“DP”)	  goods,	  and	  the	  emphasis	  he	  places	  on	  maximizing	  income	  and	  wealth	  with	  the	  market	  democratic	  difference	  principle.	  The	  first	  of	  these	  objections	  will	  challenge	  Tomasi’s	  assertion	  that	  the	  DP	  good	  of	  powers	  and	  prerogatives	  of	  office	  (PPO)	  is	  rivalrous	  with	  the	  DP	  good	  of	  income	  and	  wealth.	  The	  second	  objection	  will	  suggest	  that	  even	  if	  these	  goods	  are	  in	  fact	  rivalrous,	  it	  may	  not	  be	  true	  that	  status,	  which	  requires	  increased	  levels	  of	  PPO,	  ought	  to	  be	  sacrificed	  in	  order	  to	  secure	  agency,	  as	  Tomasi	  suggests.	  The	  last	  of	  these	  objections	  argues	  that	  even	  if	  increased	  income	  and	  wealth	  were	  to	  provide	  individuals	  with	  greater	  agency	  this	  would	  not	  guarantee	  that	  market	  democratic	  institutions	  are	  necessarily	  more	  efficient	  than	  alternative	  regime	  types,	  such	  as	  property-­‐owning	  democracies	  or	  liberal	  democratic	  socialism,	  at	  increasing	  the	  worst-­‐off’s	  holdings	  of	  income	  and	  wealth.	  All	  of	  these	  objections	  are	  to	  suggest	  that	  Rawls’	  original	  proposal	  is	  preferable	  to	  Tomasi’s	  market	  democratic	  interpretation.	  
2.	  The	  Priority	  Problem	  	   Even	  if	  it	  were	  possible	  to	  show	  that	  the	  economic	  liberties	  are	  in	  fact	  essential	  for	  the	  development	  of	  the	  two	  moral	  powers	  for	  all	  citizens—contrary	  to	  what	  I	  argued	  in	  the	  previous	  chapter—it	  does	  not	  follow	  that	  we	  ought	  to	  accept	  Tomasi’s	  free	  market	  fairness	  theory	  wholesale.	  This	  is	  because,	  by	  guaranteeing	  the	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two	  economic	  liberties	  their	  place	  in	  the	  sun,	  Tomasi	  has	  also	  guaranteed	  their	  priority	  over	  the	  second	  principle	  of	  justice.	  In	  this	  segment	  I	  will	  show	  how	  this	  consequence	  of	  Tomasi’s	  theory	  can	  be	  hugely	  problematic,	  since	  the	  lexical	  priority	  of	  freedom	  of	  economic	  contract	  over	  the	  second	  principle	  of	  justice	  makes	  it	  difficult	  for	  the	  government	  to	  enforce	  legitimate	  labor	  regulations	  while	  the	  priority	  of	  private	  productive	  property	  ownership	  may	  make	  scarcer	  the	  property	  available	  to	  non-­‐property	  owners.	  
2.1	  Freedom	  of	  Economic	  Contract	  	   Granting	  freedom	  of	  economic	  contract	  priority	  over	  the	  second	  principle	  of	  justice	  poses	  a	  direct	  threat	  to	  legitimate	  labor	  regulations.	  Historically,	  this	  problem	  has	  been	  evidenced	  in	  constitutional	  labor	  law	  cases	  from	  the	  Lochner	  era	  of	  the	  early	  20th	  century.	  During	  this	  period	  in	  American	  history,	  the	  Supreme	  Court	  took	  a	  strongly	  libertarian	  stance	  on	  interpreting	  the	  constitution,	  and	  in	  so	  doing,	  struck	  down	  upwards	  of	  200	  pieces	  of	  legislation	  involving	  government	  regulation	  of	  markets,	  on	  the	  grounds	  that	  these	  statutes	  conflicted	  with	  the	  basic	  liberties.91	  The	  landmark	  case	  of	  Lochner	  v.	  New	  York,	  which	  first	  incited	  the	  Court’s	  anti-­‐interventionist	  stance,	  ruled	  that	  a	  state	  statute	  limiting	  the	  number	  of	  hours	  a	  baker	  could	  work	  in	  a	  given	  week	  to	  60,	  posed	  an	  “unreasonable,	  unnecessary	  and	  arbitrary	  interference	  with	  the	  right	  and	  liberty	  of	  the	  individual	  to	  contract,	  in	  relation	  to	  labor,	  and	  as	  such…is	  in	  conflict	  with,	  and	  void	  under,	  the	  Federal	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  Phillips,	  Michael	  J.	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  Lochner-­‐Era	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Constitution.”92	  The	  Court	  justified	  their	  decision	  by	  arguing	  that	  this	  New	  York	  statue	  violated	  the	  14th	  amendment	  due	  process	  clause,	  which	  accords	  “no	  state	  can	  deprive	  any	  person	  of	  life,	  liberty,	  or	  property	  without	  due	  process	  of	  the	  law.”	  Since	  this	  statute	  purportedly	  deprived	  Joseph	  Lochner,	  an	  employer	  who	  permitted	  bakers	  to	  work	  more	  than	  the	  maximum	  60	  hours	  a	  week	  of	  his	  liberty	  of	  contract,	  it	  violated	  the	  14th	  amendment.	  	   What	  this	  ruling	  and	  others	  like	  it	  fail	  to	  recognize,	  is	  that	  labor	  regulations	  and	  a	  certain	  degree	  of	  government	  intervention	  are	  necessary	  to	  ensure	  fair	  labor	  conditions	  for	  all.	  In	  systems	  of	  unequal	  wealth	  and	  power	  those	  with	  more	  have	  an	  unfair	  advantage	  over	  those	  with	  less.	  When	  a	  single	  mother	  needs	  to	  work	  so	  that	  she	  can	  support	  herself	  and	  her	  children,	  there	  is	  little	  opportunity	  for	  her	  to	  negotiate	  the	  terms	  of	  her	  contract.	  In	  these	  types	  of	  situations,	  the	  mother	  could	  be	  coerced	  into	  desperation	  bargaining,	  whereby	  she	  must	  choose	  either	  to	  consent	  to	  a	  job	  that	  requires	  her	  to	  work	  in	  unfavorable	  working	  conditions	  or	  alternatively	  have	  no	  job	  at	  all	  and	  no	  way	  to	  support	  her	  family.	  Describing	  this	  phenomenon	  in	  her	  book	  Nickel	  and	  Dimed:	  On	  (Not)	  Getting	  By	  in	  America,	  Barbara	  Ehrenreich	  explains	  that	  “what	  you	  don't	  necessarily	  realize	  when	  you	  start	  selling	  your	  time	  by	  the	  hour	  is	  that	  what	  you're	  really	  selling	  is	  your	  life.”93	  The	  threat	  of	  desperation	  bargaining,	  of	  effectively	  selling	  your	  life	  away,	  would	  only	  increase	  if	  freedom	  to	  negotiate	  contracts	  were	  guaranteed	  as	  a	  basic	  liberty.	  In	  making	  freedom	  of	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  Lochner	  v.	  New	  York.	  The	  Oyez	  Project	  at	  IIT	  Chicago-­‐Kent	  College	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  Law.	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  Ehrenreich,	  Barbara.	  Nickel	  and	  Dimed:	  On	  (not)	  Getting	  by	  in	  America.	  New	  York:	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  2001.	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contract	  a	  constitutional	  essential,	  free	  market	  fairness	  effectively	  establishes	  precedence	  for	  contracts	  made	  under	  duress	  to	  be	  upheld,	  regardless	  of	  the	  inherent	  coerciveness	  of	  the	  initial	  contract	  negotiations.	  	   Tomasi	  could	  respond	  to	  this	  objection	  by	  noting	  that	  market	  democracy	  does	  not	  prohibit	  all	  regulation	  of	  the	  economic	  liberties.	  For,	  just	  as	  Rawls	  allows	  that	  some	  basic	  liberties	  may	  be	  regulated	  in	  order	  to	  generate	  the	  greatest	  bundle	  of	  basic	  liberties	  for	  all,	  so	  too	  does	  Tomasi	  allow	  that	  the	  economic	  liberties	  may	  be	  regulated	  if	  it	  will	  increase	  the	  overall	  bundle	  of	  basic	  liberties.	  In	  terms	  of	  freedom	  of	  economic	  contract,	  Tomasi	  allows	  that,	  “the	  affirmation	  of	  a	  right	  to	  occupational	  choice	  is	  compatible	  with	  a	  regulatory	  framework	  that	  imposes	  workplace	  safety	  standards.”	  However,	  Tomasi	  adds	  the	  caveat	  that	  any	  “attempts	  by	  legislative	  coalitions	  to	  limit	  the	  freedom	  of	  citizens	  [including	  the	  freedom	  of	  economic	  contract]	  must	  pass	  a	  high	  degree	  of	  judicial	  scrutiny.”	  Therefore,	  for	  Tomasi,	  regulation	  of	  the	  economic	  liberties	  is	  permissible,	  though	  it	  puts	  a	  high	  burden	  of	  proof	  on	  the	  judiciary	  to	  show	  that	  the	  restriction	  is	  in	  fact	  necessary.	  	   While	  this	  objection	  makes	  Tomasi’s	  case	  seem	  decidedly	  more	  reasonable,	  it	  does	  not	  fully	  resolve	  the	  problem	  of	  desperation	  bargaining.	  For	  although	  Tomasi	  concedes	  that	  contracts	  can	  be	  regulated	  in	  order	  to	  forestall	  impermissible	  reductions	  of	  the	  other	  basic	  liberties,	  he	  does	  not	  allow	  regulation	  of	  contracts	  for	  the	  purpose	  of	  promoting	  equal	  bargaining	  power	  between	  citizens.	  Because	  Tomasi	  values	  agency	  more	  highly	  than	  status,	  this	  issue	  of	  unequal	  status	  between	  employers	  and	  employees	  would	  be	  deemed	  an	  unfortunate	  albeit	  permissible	  consequence	  arising	  from	  having	  freedom	  of	  economic	  contract	  guaranteed	  as	  a	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basic	  right.	  If	  this	  liberty	  were	  made	  basic	  it	  would	  impose	  impermissible	  restrictions	  on	  the	  bargaining	  power	  of	  the	  worst-­‐off	  and	  their	  ability	  to	  negotiate	  contracts	  on	  an	  equal	  footing	  with	  employers.	  In	  so	  doing,	  it	  would	  worsen	  the	  position	  of	  the	  worst-­‐off	  and	  thus	  impede	  the	  fairness	  condition	  of	  free	  market	  fairness.	  
2.2.	  Right	  to	  Private	  Productive	  Property	  Ownership	  Just	  as	  prioritizing	  freedom	  of	  economic	  contract	  stymies	  a	  government’s	  ability	  to	  nullify	  unjust	  contracts,	  so	  too	  does	  prioritizing	  private	  ownership	  of	  the	  means	  of	  production	  advance	  impermissible	  inequalities	  between	  the	  property	  owning	  and	  non-­‐property	  owning	  classes.	  This	  is	  because,	  as	  Mathew	  Kramer	  describes	  it,	  while	  “property	  tends	  to	  promote	  autonomy	  by	  expanding	  the	  range	  of	  choices	  available	  to	  owners,”	  it	  also	  “tends	  to	  constrict	  autonomy	  by	  limiting	  the	  range	  of	  choices	  open	  to	  non-­‐owners.”94	  In	  this	  section,	  I	  will	  describe	  how	  prioritizing	  the	  economic	  liberty	  of	  private	  productive	  property	  can	  make	  it	  impossible	  to	  meet	  the	  distributional	  needs	  of	  the	  poor	  by	  limiting	  the	  options	  available	  to	  them.	  To	  begin,	  I	  will	  raise	  the	  issue	  of	  scarcity,	  or	  the	  problem	  that	  in	  a	  world	  of	  limited	  resources	  there	  will	  inevitably	  be	  some	  who	  are	  not	  able	  to	  own	  property.	  In	  light	  of	  this	  fact,	  if	  we	  are	  to	  expand	  property	  rights	  in	  the	  way	  that	  Tomasi	  suggests,	  this	  will	  only	  further	  increase	  the	  scarcity	  of	  property,	  by	  allowing	  private	  individuals	  to	  own	  property	  that	  could	  have	  been	  collectively	  held.	  This	  in	  turn	  would	  further	  lower	  the	  position	  of	  homeless,	  non-­‐property	  owners	  by	  giving	  them	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  Web.	  15	  Mar.	  2015.	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even	  fewer	  opportunities	  to	  own	  property.	  Following	  this	  I	  will	  introduce	  an	  argument	  that	  could	  be	  used	  to	  defend	  Tomasi	  against	  this	  claim.	  	  	  
2.2.1	  The	  Scarcity	  Problem	  One	  of	  the	  reasons	  prioritizing	  the	  right	  to	  private	  productive	  property	  ownership	  is	  so	  problematic	  is	  because	  of	  the	  empirical	  problem	  of	  scarcity.	  In	  a	  world	  of	  limited	  resources,	  such	  as	  ours,	  inalienable	  property	  rights	  lead	  to	  domination	  by	  property	  owners	  over	  non-­‐property	  owners.	  This	  is	  because,	  if	  the	  world’s	  property	  is	  fully	  owned	  by	  others	  “one	  is	  not	  permitted	  to	  do	  anything	  without	  [the	  property	  owner’s]	  consent—since	  that	  would	  involve	  the	  use	  of	  their	  property.”95	  In	  his	  paper,	  Homelessness	  and	  the	  Issue	  of	  Freedom,	  Jeremy	  Waldron	  shows	  that	  this	  scarcity	  problem	  coupled	  with	  private	  property	  rights	  seriously	  conflicts	  with	  the	  negative	  freedom	  of	  the	  homeless	  -­‐	  to	  be	  someplace	  where	  they	  are	  “not	  legally	  liable	  to	  be	  physically	  removed	  from	  that	  place	  or	  penalized	  for	  being	  there.”96	  Since	  this	  negative	  freedom	  is	  obstructed	  by	  the	  constant	  threat	  of	  eviction	  and	  civil	  or	  criminal	  sanctions	  posed	  on	  the	  homeless,	  simply	  in	  virtue	  of	  their	  lacking	  access	  to	  a	  private	  place	  to	  do	  necessary	  human	  acts,	  such	  as	  urinating	  and	  sleeping,	  the	  homeless	  are	  effectively	  made	  unfree.	  Summarizing	  this	  point	  Waldron	  states,	  “if	  an	  action	  X	  is	  prohibited	  (to	  everyone)	  in	  public	  places	  and	  if	  a	  person	  A	  has	  no	  access	  to	  a	  private	  place	  wherein	  to	  perform	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  95	  This	  same	  line	  of	  objection	  is	  often	  used	  to	  critique	  the	  Libertarian	  value	  of	  self-­‐ownership	  (See	  footnote	  5	  for	  more	  on	  self-­‐ownership).	  Vallentyne,	  Peter	  and	  van	  der	  Vossen,	  Bas,	  "Libertarianism",	  The	  Stanford	  Encyclopedia	  of	  Philosophy	  (Fall	  2014	  Edition),	  Edward	  N.	  Zalta	  (ed.),	  URL	  =	  <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2014/entries/libertarianism/>.	  	  96	  Waldron,	  Jeremy.	  "Homelessness	  and	  the	  Issue	  of	  Freedom."	  39	  UCLA	  L.	  Rev.	  1991-­‐1992.	  p.304.	  Web.	  11	  Mar.	  2015.	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it,	  then	  action	  X	  is	  effectively	  prohibited	  to	  A	  everywhere,	  and	  so	  A	  is	  comprehensively	  unfree	  to	  do	  X.”97	  On	  its	  own,	  this	  problem	  ought	  to	  be	  worrying	  for	  any	  society,	  regardless	  of	  whether	  or	  not	  they	  guarantee	  rights	  to	  private-­‐ownership	  of	  the	  means	  of	  production	  (as	  Tomasi	  proposes)	  or	  just	  guarantee	  rights	  to	  ownership	  of	  personal	  property	  without	  strictly	  guaranteeing	  rights	  to	  private	  ownership	  of	  the	  means	  of	  production	  (as	  Rawls	  does).	  However,	  the	  reason	  this	  problem	  is	  more	  troubling	  for	  Tomasi’s	  case	  than	  Rawls’,	  is	  that	  in	  seeking	  to	  expand	  the	  range	  of	  property	  available	  for	  private	  ownership,	  Tomasi	  is	  effectively	  making	  the	  amount	  of	  property	  that	  is	  available	  to	  the	  poorest,	  non-­‐property	  owners	  even	  scarcer.	  Whereas	  on	  Rawls’	  view	  “institutions	  must,	  from	  the	  outset,	  put	  in	  the	  hands	  of	  citizens	  generally,	  and	  not	  only	  of	  a	  few,	  sufficient	  productive	  means	  for	  them	  to	  be	  fully	  cooperating	  members	  of	  society	  on	  a	  footing	  of	  equality”	  Tomasi’s	  view	  could	  permit	  the	  means	  of	  production	  to	  be	  held	  by	  an	  elite	  class,	  thus	  overriding	  Rawls’	  distributional	  requirement	  that	  property	  be	  made	  more	  available	  to	  non-­‐property	  owners.98	  	  
2.2.2	  Defending	  Tomasi	  Against	  the	  Scarcity	  Problem	  Although	  one	  could	  deduce	  from	  the	  previous	  section	  that	  society	  necessarily	  benefits	  from	  having	  inequality	  in	  property	  holdings	  reduced,	  it	  is	  not	  true	  that	  this	  entailment	  relationship	  always	  holds.	  There	  are	  certain	  cases	  when	  it	  may	  in	  fact	  be	  detrimental	  to	  society	  to	  transfer	  property	  from	  one	  class	  of	  people	  to	  another,	  simply	  to	  make	  the	  distribution	  in	  property	  holdings	  more	  egalitarian.	  The	  following	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  97	  Waldron,	  p.315.	  98	  Rawls,	  TJ,	  p.140.	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example	  by	  David	  Schmidtz	  provides	  such	  a	  case,	  where	  keeping	  property	  in	  the	  hands	  of	  the	  few	  may	  in	  fact	  improve	  overall	  social	  welfare	  and	  by	  extension	  the	  welfare	  of	  the	  poor:	  “Given	  one	  unit	  of	  corn,	  Jane	  Poor	  will	  put	  it	  to	  its	  highest	  valued	  use,	  namely	  immediate	  consumption.	  Joe	  Rich,	  having	  already	  consumed	  a	  unit	  and	  thus	  being	  satiated	  for	  the	  moment,	  will	  invest	  the	  corn	  in	  something	  that	  is,	  by	  Rich’s	  own	  lights,	  less	  urgent.	  Poor	  eats	  the	  corn,	  whereas	  Rich,	  already	  having	  eaten	  enough,	  has	  nothing	  better	  to	  do	  with	  his	  surplus	  than	  to	  plant	  it.”99	  In	  this	  example,	  granting	  Joe	  Rich	  the	  right	  to	  retain	  his	  surplus	  holdings	  of	  corn	  makes	  it	  the	  case	  that	  he	  can	  then	  plant	  the	  excess	  corn,	  and	  in	  so	  doing,	  make	  more	  corn	  available	  to	  society	  as	  a	  whole.	  This	  shows	  that	  despite	  the	  fact	  that	  Joe	  Rich	  experiences	  diminishing	  marginal	  utility	  of	  consumption,	  whereby	  each	  additional	  piece	  of	  corn	  he	  consumes	  is	  less	  satisfying	  then	  the	  first,	  this	  does	  not	  necessarily	  mean	  that	  he	  should	  just	  eat	  one	  piece	  of	  corn	  and	  donate	  the	  second	  to	  Jane	  Poor.	  Rather,	  if	  Joe	  plants	  the	  corn,	  and	  in	  so	  doing	  makes	  10	  more	  pieces	  of	  corn,	  this	  would	  improve	  overall	  social	  welfare	  by	  generating	  enough	  food	  to	  feed	  himself,	  Jane	  and	  eight	  other	  people	  as	  well.	  This	  shows	  that	  “In	  a	  world	  of	  production,	  diminishing	  marginal	  utility	  of	  consumption	  implies	  less	  and	  less	  reason	  to	  consume	  and,	  relatively	  speaking,	  more	  and	  more	  reason	  to	  invest	  in	  long-­‐range	  production.”100	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  99	  Schmidtz,	  David.	  “Diminishing	  Marginal	  Utility	  and	  Egalitarian	  Redistribution”,	  The	  Journal	  of	  Value	  Inquiry	  34:2/3	  (2000).	  p.	  267.	  Web.	  	  100Schmidtz,	  p.271.	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Relating	  this	  back	  to	  Tomasi’s	  theory,	  it	  now	  appears	  that	  what	  may	  be	  maximally	  beneficial	  for	  the	  poor	  is	  to	  allow	  productive	  property	  to	  be	  held	  in	  the	  hands	  of	  only	  a	  few,	  wealthy	  citizens.	  For,	  as	  this	  case	  suggests,	  granting	  some	  individuals	  private	  property	  rights	  of	  the	  means	  of	  production	  can	  crucially	  contribute	  to	  improving	  the	  position	  of	  the	  worst-­‐off.	  Since	  it	  is	  at	  least	  possible	  that	  the	  poor	  will	  have	  more	  access	  to	  essential	  goods	  if	  the	  right	  to	  private	  productive	  property	  is	  protected,	  this	  suggests	  that	  prioritizing	  ownership	  of	  private	  productive	  property	  over	  concerns	  of	  the	  equal	  distribution	  of	  property	  can	  be	  defended	  on	  Tomasi’s	  account.	  In	  summation,	  while	  Tomasi	  may	  be	  able	  to	  avoid	  the	  current	  objection	  against	  prioritizing	  private	  productive	  property	  rights	  over	  the	  distributional	  concerns	  of	  the	  non-­‐property	  owning	  class,	  he	  still	  must	  answer	  for	  granting	  freedom	  of	  economic	  contract	  priority	  status.	  Since	  prioritizing	  freedom	  of	  economic	  contract	  allows	  for	  unequal	  bargaining	  power	  between	  citizens,	  it	  threatens	  to	  solidify	  the	  relational	  status	  of	  the	  laboring	  class	  as	  distinctly	  lesser	  than	  the	  employing	  class,	  which	  seems	  an	  impermissible	  outcome	  for	  any	  theory	  of	  justice.	  With	  this	  priority	  problem	  settled,	  I	  will	  now	  move	  on	  to	  address	  some	  crucial	  assumptions	  underlying	  Tomasi’s	  amendments	  to	  the	  difference	  principle.	  
3.	  Rivalrous	  DP	  Goods	  (PPO	  v.	  Income	  and	  Wealth)	  Trade-­‐offs	  are	  a	  common	  occurrence	  in	  day-­‐to-­‐day	  life.	  In	  deciding	  whether	  or	  not	  to	  go	  out	  to	  a	  movie	  tonight	  with	  friends	  or	  stay	  in	  to	  study	  for	  your	  exam	  you	  are	  forced	  to	  weigh	  the	  opportunity	  costs	  associated	  with	  each	  option	  in	  order	  to	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decide	  which	  of	  the	  two	  options	  is	  best	  for	  you	  to	  do.	  In	  his	  interpretation	  of	  the	  bundle	  of	  DP	  goods,	  Tomasi	  sees	  a	  similar	  kind	  of	  trade-­‐off	  as	  existing	  between	  the	  DP	  goods	  of	  income	  and	  wealth	  and	  powers	  and	  prerogatives	  of	  office.	  As	  he	  puts	  it,	  “some	  of	  the	  DP	  goods	  are	  rivalrous,	  such	  that	  a	  choice	  to	  increase	  shares	  on	  one	  dimension	  of	  the	  bundle	  requires	  that	  we	  accept	  diminished	  shares	  on	  another.”101	  	  In	  Tomasi’s	  mind,	  this	  trade-­‐off	  requires	  us	  to	  pick	  between	  two	  competing	  interpretations	  of	  the	  difference	  principle.	  On	  the	  one	  hand,	  we	  could	  select	  the	  capitalist	  (market	  democratic)	  interpretation,	  which	  seeks	  to	  “satisfy	  the	  difference	  principle	  by	  virtue	  of	  producing	  greater	  wealth	  over	  time.”	  This	  he	  refers	  to	  as	  the	  “greater	  wealth	  thesis.”	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  we	  could	  select	  the	  more	  egalitarian	  (social	  democratic)	  interpretation,	  which	  may	  limit	  the	  share	  of	  income	  and	  wealth	  distributed	  to	  the	  worst-­‐off	  in	  order	  to	  ensure	  that	  citizens	  have	  greater	  “democratic	  powers	  to	  make	  economic	  decisions,	  including	  democratic	  powers	  of	  control	  over	  productive	  resources.”102	  This	  interpretation	  Tomasi	  refers	  to	  as	  the	  “democratic	  workplace	  power	  thesis.”103	  Tomasi	  favors	  the	  capitalist	  interpretation,	  whereas,	  he	  argues,	  high	  liberals	  favor	  the	  egalitarian	  interpretation.	  For	  Tomasi,	  the	  trade	  off	  between	  more	  democratic	  workplace	  power	  and	  greater	  income	  and	  wealth	  is	  easily	  decided	  when	  you	  consider	  the	  fact	  that	  if	  you	  were	  to	  offer	  anyone	  the	  option	  of	  having	  their	  wages	  lowered	  in	  favor	  of	  having	  their	  workplace	  participation	  increased,	  you	  would	  be	  hard-­‐pressed	  to	  find	  anyone	  who	  would	  agree	  to	  such	  a	  trade.	  This	  is	  because	  “a	  reduction	  in	  wages	  amounts	  to	  a	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  Tomasi,	  FMF,	  p.186.	  102	  Tomasi,	  FMF,	  p.188.	  103	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reduction	  in	  [your]	  effective	  power	  to	  use	  [your]	  rights	  in	  pursuit	  of	  projects	  that	  are	  central	  to	  [your	  life].”104	  Or	  so	  says	  Tomasi.	  But	  I	  am	  unconvinced	  by	  this	  conclusion	  for	  two	  reasons.	  First	  of	  all,	  it	  assumes	  that	  democratic	  workplaces	  and	  greater	  wealth	  are	  in	  fact	  rivalrous,	  which,	  as	  I	  will	  show,	  is	  not	  necessarily	  the	  case.	  And	  second,	  it	  assumes	  that	  having	  more	  money,	  rather	  than	  more	  workplace	  democracy,	  enables	  individuals	  to	  feel	  that	  they	  have	  greater	  self-­‐authorship	  over	  their	  lives.	  In	  what	  follows	  I	  will	  address	  each	  of	  these	  assumptions	  in	  turn.	  
3.1.	  Against	  Assumption	  1	  	   In	  arguing	  that	  greater	  wealth	  is	  rivalrous	  with	  greater	  workplace	  democracy,	  Tomasi	  starts	  from	  the	  assumption	  that	  economic	  growth,	  and	  by	  extension	  greater	  wealth,	  is	  more	  attainable	  in	  a	  free	  market	  society	  than	  in	  a	  more	  egalitarian	  or	  democratic	  society.	  The	  table	  on	  the	  next	  page,	  first	  imagined	  by	  Jason	  Brennan,	  helps	  to	  illustrate	  this	  point	  by	  comparing	  the	  material	  holdings	  that	  arise	  in	  a	  capitalist	  society	  (ParetoSuperiorLand)	  with	  the	  material	  holdings	  that	  arise	  in	  a	  more	  egalitarian	  society	  (FairnessLand).	  	  For	  our	  purposes	  we	  can	  imagine	  ParetoSuperiorLand	  as	  representing	  one	  of	  Tomasi’s	  preferred	  market	  democratic	  regimes,	  and	  FairnessLand	  as	  representing	  one	  of	  the	  more	  egalitarian	  regime	  types	  favored	  by	  Rawls.	  Interpreting	  this	  graph	  from	  the	  Tomasi/Brennan	  standpoint,	  it	  reveals	  that	  as	  time	  goes	  by,	  the	  absolute	  position	  of	  the	  worst-­‐off	  is	  exponentially	  improved	  in	  ParetoSuperiorLand	  as	  a	  result	  of	  the	  material	  benefits	  associated	  with	  efficient,	  economic	  growth	  brought	  about	  by	  free	  market	  competition.	  	  As	  a	  result	  of	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  104	  Tomasi,	  FMF,	  p.191.	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this	  economic	  efficiency,	  society	  benefits	  with	  eight	  times	  as	  much	  growth	  in	  ParetoSuperiorLand	  as	  in	  FairnessLand.	  	  
	  From	  this,	  Tomasi	  concludes	  that	  market	  democratic	  regimes	  necessarily	  lead	  to	  higher	  growth	  rates	  and	  greater	  wealth	  for	  everyone,	  including	  the	  worst-­‐off,	  than	  do	  more	  egalitarian/democratic	  regimes.105	  	  	   3.1.1	  Equal	  Economic	  Incentive	  	   In	  response	  to	  this,	  I	  argue	  that	  Tomasi’s	  conclusion	  is	  far	  too	  hasty	  since	  both	  of	  Rawls’	  preferred	  regime	  types,	  property-­‐owning	  democracy	  and	  liberal	  democratic	  socialism,	  meet	  all	  of	  the	  same	  necessary	  conditions	  for	  promoting	  economic	  growth	  and	  increasing	  wealth,	  as	  do	  Tomasi’s	  preferred	  regime	  types.	  For	  example,	  both	  property-­‐owning	  democracies	  and	  market	  democracies	  incentivize	  productivity	  by	  granting	  the	  right	  to	  private	  ownership	  of	  the	  means	  of	  production.	  The	  only	  notable	  difference	  between	  the	  two	  is	  that	  property-­‐owning	  democracies	  require	  that	  wealth	  be	  broadly	  distributed	  across	  society	  so	  as	  to	  avoid	  the	  wealth	  being	  concentrated	  in	  the	  hands	  of	  a	  small	  elite.106	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In	  addition	  to	  this,	  property-­‐owning	  democracies	  may	  actually	  lead	  to	  even	  greater	  economic	  growth	  than	  market	  democracies	  as	  a	  result	  of	  their	  additional	  commitment	  to	  seeking	  full	  employment.	  Although	  most	  economists	  agree	  that	  productivity	  is	  the	  number	  one	  determinant	  of	  economic	  growth	  it	  is	  important	  to	  note	  that	  it	  is	  not	  the	  only	  one.	  	  In	  his	  book,	  The	  Way	  it	  Worked	  and	  Why	  it	  Won’t:	  Structural	  Change	  and	  the	  Slowdown	  of	  U.S.	  Economic	  Growth,	  Professor	  Gordon	  Bjork	  illustrated	  this	  point	  when	  he	  wrote,	  “Is	  growth	  in	  productivity	  always	  the	  most	  important	  determinant	  of	  growth	  in	  per	  capita	  GDP?	  No.	  In	  the	  decade	  ending	  in	  1980,	  the	  gains	  from	  increased	  [workplace]	  participation	  contributed	  more	  than	  productivity	  to	  the	  growth	  in	  GDP	  per	  capita.”	  107	  This	  example	  shows	  that	  productivity	  is	  not	  the	  only	  way	  for	  a	  society	  to	  promote	  growth	  and	  increase	  holdings	  of	  income	  and	  wealth.	  Instead,	  higher	  rates	  of	  employment	  can	  lead	  to	  greater	  income	  and	  wealth	  as	  well.	  If	  this	  is	  true	  then	  it	  seems	  that	  property-­‐owning	  democracies,	  which	  aim	  at	  both	  full	  employment	  and	  efficient	  markets	  are	  superior	  to	  Tomasi’s	  regimes	  because	  they	  target	  two	  primary	  determinants	  of	  economic	  growth,	  whereas	  market	  democracies,	  which	  permit	  unemployment,	  only	  aim	  at	  one	  -­‐	  a	  productive	  and	  efficient	  free	  market.	  Since	  this	  is	  true,	  it	  seems	  that	  property-­‐owning	  democracies	  are	  superior	  to	  market	  democracies	  in	  promoting	  economic	  growth	  and	  increasing	  shares	  of	  income	  and	  wealth.	  Therefore,	  Tomasi’s	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  107	  Bjork’s	  quote	  continues	  on	  to	  grant	  that	  “productivity	  is	  usually	  the	  most	  important	  determinant	  and,	  in	  the	  long	  run,	  growth	  in	  per	  capita	  income	  resulting	  from	  productivity	  growth	  is	  the	  primary	  reason	  for	  growth	  and	  is	  modified	  by	  the	  other	  factors.”	  This	  concession	  is	  consistent	  with	  my	  argument	  since	  it	  is	  not	  imperative	  that	  increased	  employment	  is	  always	  the	  best	  determinant	  of	  growth.	  Rather	  it	  is	  sufficient	  to	  show	  that	  because	  employment	  can	  at	  least	  in	  one	  example	  play	  a	  larger	  role	  in	  determining	  growth	  than	  productivity,	  than	  it	  is	  better	  to	  have	  a	  system	  that	  allows	  for	  higher	  levels	  of	  employment	  and	  productivity.	  	  (Bjork,	  Gordon	  C.	  The	  Way	  It	  Worked	  and	  Why	  It	  Won't:	  Structural	  Change	  and	  the	  Slowdown	  of	  U.S.	  Economic	  Growth.	  Westport,	  CT:	  Praeger,	  1999.	  p.69.	  Print).	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assumption	  that	  greater	  wealth	  and	  greater	  democratic	  workplaces	  are	  necessarily	  rivalrous	  is	  wrong.	  Rawls’	  second	  proposed	  regime	  type,	  liberal	  (democratic)	  socialism,	  can	  likewise	  be	  proven	  to	  be	  preferable	  to	  Tomasi’s	  market	  democratic	  regimes.	  This	  is	  because	  its	  call	  for	  private	  (albeit	  collective)	  ownership	  of	  the	  means	  of	  production	  has	  the	  same	  potential	  for	  incentivizing	  productivity,	  as	  does	  the	  market	  democratic	  call	  for	  private	  (individual)	  ownership	  of	  the	  means	  of	  production.108	  To	  illustrate	  this	  idea	  further,	  imagine	  a	  market	  that	  allows	  for	  individual	  private	  ownership	  of	  the	  means	  of	  production.	  In	  this	  situation	  competing	  firms	  A	  and	  B,	  which	  are	  privately	  owned,	  are	  both	  subject	  to	  the	  laws	  of	  economic	  competition.	  If	  we	  assume	  that	  these	  rivalrous	  companies	  are	  competing	  in	  a	  perfectly	  competitive	  market,	  such	  that	  there	  are	  many	  buyers	  and	  sellers	  and	  prices	  are	  determined	  by	  the	  laws	  of	  supply	  and	  demand,	  then	  at	  the	  level	  of	  ideal	  theory,	  the	  resulting	  market	  will	  be	  Pareto	  efficient,	  so	  that	  no	  one	  can	  be	  made	  better	  off	  without	  making	  someone	  else	  worse	  off.	  This	  is	  the	  golden	  rule	  of	  economics,	  and	  why	  so	  many	  assume	  that	  free	  markets,	  which	  naturally	  bolster	  competition,	  are	  preferable	  to	  interventionist	  systems	  that	  might	  reduce	  the	  competitive	  edge.	  However,	  liberal	  (democratic)	  socialism	  would	  not	  undermine	  the	  positive	  effects	  of	  perfect	  competition.	  For,	  although	  these	  regimes	  do	  require	  some	  intervention	  in	  the	  economy,	  so	  as	  to	  ensure	  that	  individuals	  have	  enough	  say	  in	  their	  workplaces	  and	  thus	  promote	  the	  DP	  good	  of	  powers	  and	  prerogatives	  of	  office,	  they	  do	  not	  remove	  the	  incentives	  engendered	  by	  free	  market	  competition.	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Instead	  liberal	  socialist	  democracies	  shift	  incentive	  competition	  from	  the	  individual	  to	  the	  collective.	  In	  this	  way,	  instead	  of	  person	  A’s	  privately	  held	  firm	  directly	  competing	  with	  person	  B’s	  privately	  held	  firm,	  it	  could	  instead	  turn	  out	  that	  in	  a	  liberal	  socialist	  society	  person	  A	  and	  B	  work	  together	  in	  a	  collectively	  owned	  firm	  that	  directly	  competes	  with	  person	  C	  and	  D’s	  collectively	  owned	  firm.	  As	  a	  result,	  the	  market	  will	  continue	  to	  function	  as	  it	  had	  before	  with	  the	  two	  firms	  competing	  to	  meet	  the	  market	  demand	  and	  in	  this	  way	  the	  market	  will	  remain	  Pareto	  efficient	  despite	  excluding	  the	  right	  to	  individual	  private	  property	  ownership.	  Since	  both	  property-­‐owning	  democracies	  and	  liberal	  socialist	  democracies	  can	  function	  as	  productively,	  if	  not	  more	  productively,	  than	  can	  market	  democracies,	  it	  follows	  that	  property-­‐owning	  democracies	  and	  liberal	  socialist	  democracies	  can	  also	  generate	  the	  same	  economic	  growth,	  and	  by	  extension,	  income	  and	  wealth	  as	  can	  market	  democratic	  regimes.109	  Since,	  in	  addition	  to	  increasing	  citizens’	  holdings	  of	  wealth,	  these	  two	  Rawlsian	  regimes	  also	  seek	  to	  increase	  citizens’	  holdings	  of	  powers	  and	  prerogatives,	  it	  follows	  that	  Tomasi’s	  claim	  -­‐	  that	  the	  DP	  good	  of	  income	  and	  wealth	  is	  rivalrous	  with	  the	  DP	  good	  of	  powers	  and	  prerogatives	  of	  office	  -­‐	  is	  wrong.	  	  
3.2	  Against	  Assumption	  2:	  Against	  Tomasi’s	  second	  objection,	  there	  are	  many	  historic	  examples	  undercutting	  the	  assumption	  that	  individuals	  would	  feel	  a	  greater	  sense	  of	  self-­‐
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  109	  “Productivity	  gains	  have	  historically	  led	  to	  gains	  in	  real	  income,	  lower	  inflation	  and	  increased	  corporate	  profitability.	  A	  company	  that	  is	  increasing	  output	  with	  the	  same	  number	  of	  hours	  worked	  will	  likely	  be	  more	  profitable,	  which	  means	  that	  it	  can	  raise	  wages	  without	  passing	  that	  cost	  on	  to	  customers,	  which	  keeps	  inflation	  pressures	  down,	  while	  adding	  to	  GDP	  growth	  (Barnes,	  Ryan	  Economic	  indicators:	  Productivity	  Report,	  Investopedia).”	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authorship	  by	  having	  access	  to	  more	  wealth	  than	  having	  more	  opportunities	  for	  workplace	  democracy.	  In	  response	  to	  the	  burgeoning	  capitalism	  that	  swept	  over	  Britain	  during	  the	  Industrial	  Revolution,	  individuals	  turned	  to	  collective	  organization	  in	  the	  form	  of	  labor	  unions	  to	  protect	  themselves	  from	  becoming	  just	  another	  “appendage	  of	  the	  machine.”110	  And	  today	  many	  companies	  continue	  to	  promote	  greater	  workplace	  democracy	  as	  a	  way	  of	  valuing	  the	  contributions	  of	  each	  employee.	  As	  Andrew	  Maynard,	  Director	  of	  Strategic	  Supply	  Chain	  Management	  for	  the	  WD-­‐40	  Company	  commented,	  “What	  I	  enjoy	  most	  about	  working	  in	  a	  democratic	  workplace	  is	  the	  prevalence	  of	  dignity	  and	  respect	  for	  the	  individual	  and	  their	  unique	  contribution.	  In	  this	  environment,	  every	  employee	  has	  something	  significant	  to	  contribute	  and	  the	  role	  of	  management	  is	  to	  enable	  the	  team	  members	  in	  meeting	  both	  individual	  and	  collective	  goals.”111	  As	  a	  way	  of	  pushing	  back	  against	  this	  claim,	  Tomasi	  argues	  that	  when	  the	  option	  of	  having	  increased	  democratic	  workplace	  opportunities	  is	  compared	  with	  the	  option	  of	  having	  increased	  shares	  of	  income	  and	  wealth	  people	  would	  certainly	  choose	  the	  latter	  over	  the	  former.	  The	  way	  he	  describes	  it	  is	  that	  professors	  would	  surely	  prefer	  having	  higher	  salaries	  to	  having	  more	  frequent	  committee	  meetings.112	  However,	  this	  is	  hardly	  an	  indisputable	  claim.	  For	  it	  is	  probable	  that	  some	  professors	  would	  be	  loath	  to	  sacrifice	  their	  participation	  in	  committee	  meetings	  for	  a	  salary	  increase,	  due	  to	  their	  moral	  or	  philosophical	  commitment	  to	  contributing	  to	  the	  goings	  on	  of	  their	  workplace.	  Since	  the	  workplace	  is	  where	  these	  professors	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  110	  Marx,	  Karl,	  Friedrich	  Engels,	  and	  Jones	  G.	  Stedman.	  The	  Communist	  Manifesto.	  London:	  Penguin	  Books,	  2002.	  p.227.	  Print.	  111	  "WorldBlu	  -­‐	  Freedom	  at	  Work."	  WorldBlu.	  N.p.,	  n.d.	  Web.	  10	  Apr.	  2015.	  112	  	  Tomasi,	  FMF,	  p.191.	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spend	  most	  of	  their	  days	  and	  where	  they	  engage	  in	  dialogue	  with	  colleagues	  about	  their	  particular	  shared	  areas	  of	  interest,	  professors	  are	  enormously	  affected	  by	  decisions	  made	  in	  these	  meetings	  and,	  being	  aware	  of	  this,	  many	  are	  likely	  to	  be	  reluctant	  to	  sacrifice	  these	  opportunities	  for	  income	  and	  wealth.	  Furthermore,	  even	  if	  Tomasi	  were	  correct	  in	  assuming	  that	  professors	  and	  the	  like	  would,	  on	  the	  whole,	  prefer	  greater	  levels	  of	  income	  and	  wealth	  to	  more	  participation	  in	  their	  workplaces,	  it	  is	  possible	  that	  this	  premise	  may	  only	  hold	  against	  the	  backdrop	  of	  our	  current,	  highly	  capitalist	  society.	  Because	  of	  the	  way	  our	  society	  is	  now	  structured	  it	  may	  be	  the	  case	  that	  individuals	  are	  skeptical	  about	  whether	  or	  not	  greater	  participation	  in	  the	  workplace	  would	  actually	  lead	  to	  any	  real,	  tangible	  changes	  in	  their	  day-­‐to-­‐day	  activities.	  However,	  if	  it	  were	  possible	  for	  workplace	  participation	  to	  be	  implemented	  so	  as	  to	  allow	  for	  real	  democratic	  payoff	  in	  the	  workplace,	  so	  one’s	  complaints	  and	  suggestions	  would	  actually	  be	  listened	  to	  and	  acted	  upon,	  then	  it	  is	  possible	  that	  preferences	  in	  this	  more	  egalitarian	  society	  would	  lean	  in	  favor	  of	  promoting	  PPO	  over	  income	  and	  wealth.	  For	  this	  reason,	  Tomasi’s	  assumption	  that	  individuals	  would	  prefer	  having	  greater	  wealth	  to	  greater	  democratic	  workplace	  participation	  does	  not	  consider	  the	  possibility	  that	  preferences	  would	  likely	  change	  if	  the	  structure	  of	  society	  changed	  as	  well.	  
4.	  Status	  v.	  Agency	  Harkening	  back	  to	  an	  earlier	  distinction	  made	  between	  Tomasi	  and	  Rawls,	  it	  may	  be	  helpful	  to	  consider	  this	  greater	  wealth	  v.	  greater	  democratic	  workplace	  debate	  as	  an	  extension	  of	  the	  earlier	  status	  v.	  agency	  debate.113	  For	  Tomasi,	  the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  113	  See	  p.32	  section	  on	  Status	  v.	  Agency:	  How	  Best	  to	  Approach	  Fairness?	  	  
	   69	  
reason	  we	  ought	  to	  increase	  the	  poor’s	  holdings	  of	  income	  and	  wealth	  is	  so	  that	  we	  may	  provide	  them	  with	  the	  greatest	  opportunity	  to	  exercise	  their	  agency.	  On	  his	  account,	  “self-­‐respect	  comes	  primarily	  from	  seeing	  oneself	  as	  a	  central	  cause	  of	  the	  particular	  life	  one	  is	  living.”	  In	  contrast	  to	  this	  view,	  Tomasi	  takes	  social	  democrats	  to	  be	  seeking	  to	  increase	  democratic	  participation	  in	  the	  workplace	  with	  the	  goal	  of	  improving	  the	  relational	  status	  between	  citizens.	  As	  he	  puts	  it,	  “social	  democracy	  emphasizes	  the	  importance	  of	  each	  citizen	  being	  recognized	  as	  an	  equal	  political	  participant	  in	  the	  shared	  life	  of	  the	  community”	  where	  “self-­‐respect	  comes	  primarily	  from	  being	  recognized	  by	  others	  in	  a	  certain	  way.”114	  One	  objection	  to	  this	  agency	  v.	  status	  distinction	  is	  that	  it	  ignores	  the	  inherent	  restrictions	  imposed	  by	  capitalist	  societies	  on	  agency.	  Even	  at	  the	  level	  of	  ideal	  theory,	  capitalism	  threatens	  to	  impinge	  on	  the	  agential	  capabilities	  of	  citizens	  by	  failing	  to	  guarantee	  them	  employment.	  Additionally,	  there	  is	  a	  fear	  that	  capitalist	  societies	  may	  permit	  the	  formation	  of	  monopolies,	  which	  would	  decrease	  citizens’	  agency	  by	  reducing	  overall	  societal	  income.	  Although,	  I	  will	  concede	  that	  Tomasi’s	  theory	  can	  make	  allowance	  for	  this	  concern.	  Yet,	  while	  Tomasi	  may	  escape	  this	  particular	  critique,	  there	  is	  still	  another	  worry	  that	  he	  must	  respond	  to;	  namely,	  the	  problem	  of	  class	  domination,	  which	  necessarily	  arises	  from	  allowing	  extreme	  inequalities	  in	  material	  holdings.	  
4.1	  Unemployment	  Regarding	  employment,	  Tomasi	  assumes	  that	  individuals	  in	  a	  competitive	  market	  will	  have	  “enhanced	  power	  as	  individuals	  to	  bargain	  for	  better	  conditions,	  or	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  114	  	  Tomasi,	  FMF,	  p.194.	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even	  to	  walk	  away”,	  presumably	  when	  employers	  enforce	  oppressive	  or	  discriminatory	  practices.	  However,	  this	  notion	  that	  the	  power	  would	  lie	  with	  the	  laboring	  class	  rather	  than	  with	  the	  employers	  seems	  misguided	  when	  one	  considers	  the	  fact	  that	  even	  in	  an	  idealized	  market	  democratic	  society,	  unemployment	  is	  a	  natural	  byproduct	  of	  market	  competition.	  As	  Carl	  Shapiro	  and	  Joseph	  Stiglitz	  describe	  it,	  “the	  equilibrium	  unemployment	  rate	  [in	  a	  labor	  market]	  must	  be	  sufficiently	  large	  that	  it	  pays	  workers	  to	  work	  rather	  than	  to	  take	  the	  risk	  of	  being	  caught	  shirking.”115	  Since	  this	  is	  the	  case,	  certain	  individuals	  will	  inevitably	  be	  without	  work	  and	  by	  extension	  without	  a	  steady	  income,	  which	  by	  Tomasi’s	  own	  account	  necessarily	  restricts	  their	  ability	  to	  exercise	  their	  agency.	  Alternatively,	  Rawls’s	  property-­‐owning	  democracies	  actively	  create	  arrangements,	  “to	  pursue	  macroeconomic	  objectives,	  such	  as	  the	  pursuit	  of	  full	  employment.”116	  	  Since	  the	  unemployed	  population	  account	  for	  a	  sub-­‐set	  of	  some	  of	  the	  worst-­‐off	  members	  of	  society,	  I	  am	  skeptical	  of	  Tomasi’s	  claim	  that	  market	  democracies	  do	  a	  better	  job	  at	  increasing	  the	  worst-­‐off’s	  agency	  than	  do	  Rawls’	  social	  democratic	  alternatives.	  Under	  market	  democratic	  regimes	  there	  is	  no	  guarantee	  that	  the	  worst-­‐off	  will	  have	  any	  employment	  whatsoever,	  and	  as	  a	  result	  their	  agency	  will	  be	  restricted.	  Conversely,	  property-­‐owning	  democratic	  regimes	  directly	  aim	  at	  full-­‐employment,	  and	  thus	  guarantee	  that	  the	  worst-­‐off	  in	  society	  will	  have	  at	  least	  some	  income	  to	  enable	  them	  to	  exercise	  their	  agency.	  
4.2	  Monopolization	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  115	  Shapiro,	  Carl	  and	  Stiglitz,	  Joseph	  E.	  'Equilibrium	  Unemployment	  as	  a	  Worker	  Discipline	  Device',	  American	  Economic	  Review,	  1984,	  74,	  p.433-­‐44.	  64.	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Further	  reason	  to	  worry	  about	  Tomasi’s	  claim	  that	  market	  democratic	  regimes	  better	  enable	  individuals	  to	  increase	  their	  agency	  is	  that	  government	  regulation	  of	  monopolies	  would	  likely	  be	  made	  more	  difficult	  on	  Tomasi’s	  account.	  In	  more	  unregulated	  economies,	  such	  as	  the	  kind	  Tomasi	  supports,	  monopolies	  arise	  when	  individual	  companies	  control	  scarce	  resource	  or	  patented	  goods.	  Due	  to	  their	  hold	  over	  the	  market,	  monopolists	  are	  in	  a	  unique	  position	  to	  set	  prices	  above	  the	  perfectly	  competitive	  price	  and	  reap	  profits	  at	  the	  cost	  of	  overall	  social	  welfare.	  Put	  succinctly,	  “When	  the	  monopolist	  raises	  prices	  above	  the	  competitive	  level	  in	  order	  to	  reap	  his	  monopoly	  profits,	  customers	  buy	  less	  of	  the	  product,	  less	  is	  produced,	  and	  society	  as	  a	  whole	  is	  worse	  off.	  In	  short,	  monopoly	  reduces	  society’s	  income.”117	  Within	  the	  terms	  of	  Tomasi’s	  account,	  a	  reduction	  in	  income	  equates	  to	  a	  reduction	  in	  agency.	  In	  combatting	  this	  particular	  objection,	  two	  claims	  can	  be	  made	  in	  Tomasi’s	  defense.	  First,	  Tomasi	  can	  argue	  in	  line	  with	  classical	  liberals	  that	  the	  government	  is	  permitted	  to	  intervene	  in	  instances	  where	  collusion	  or	  monopolies	  over	  scarce	  goods	  are	  concerned	  so	  as	  to	  maintain	  a	  competitive	  market	  place.118	  Second,	  he	  can	  argue	  that	  to	  assume	  the	  presence	  of	  monopolies	  is	  to	  assume	  a	  non-­‐idealized	  version	  of	  free-­‐market	  capitalism,	  one	  bereft	  of	  fully	  competitive	  and	  free	  markets.	  Since,	  in	  deriving	  our	  basic	  structure	  of	  society,	  we	  are	  asked	  to	  adopt	  an	  idealized,	  or	  special	  conception	  of	  justice	  for	  which	  we	  assume	  “social	  conditions	  favorable	  to	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  Stigler,	  George	  J.	  "Monopoly."	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  Encyclopedia	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  and	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  Tomasi,	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  “The	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  Case	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  2014	  Index	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  Freedom:	  Promoting	  Economic	  Opportunity	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the	  attainment	  of	  social	  justice,”	  the	  worry	  about	  monopolies	  does	  not	  pose	  a	  serious	  threat	  to	  Tomasi’s	  view,	  for	  in	  an	  ideal	  society	  markets	  would	  be	  perfectly	  competitive.119	  	  
4.3	  Class	  Domination	  The	  further	  consideration	  about	  class	  domination	  is	  one	  that	  was	  thought-­‐provokingly	  raised	  by	  Anna	  Stilz	  in	  her	  article,	  Is	  the	  Free	  Market	  Fair?	  In	  this	  article,	  Stilz	  argues	  plausibly	  that,	  “extreme	  material	  inequalities	  can	  undermine	  agency,	  by	  allowing	  some	  private	  individuals	  to	  dominate	  others	  in	  ways	  that	  deprive	  them	  of	  self-­‐direction.”120	  This	  is	  because	  market	  democratic	  institutions	  have	  no	  way	  of	  quelling	  “intergenerational	  transmission	  of	  advantage.”121	  One	  way	  in	  which	  this	  type	  of	  class	  domination	  may	  occur	  in	  a	  market	  democratic	  society	  is	  that	  exceedingly	  wealthy	  parents	  may	  donate	  large	  sums	  of	  money	  to	  elite	  universities,	  and	  through	  this	  generous	  contribution,	  tacitly	  ensure	  the	  future	  admission	  of	  their	  children,	  grandchildren	  and	  great	  grandchildren.	  Conversely,	  children	  whose	  parents	  do	  not	  have	  the	  means	  to	  donate	  such	  a	  large	  amount	  of	  money	  to	  universities	  will	  not	  have	  this	  advantage	  and	  will	  be	  subject	  to	  a	  slightly	  lower	  status.	  In	  situations	  like	  this,	  the	  rich	  may	  regularly	  be	  more	  advantaged	  than	  the	  poor,	  thus	  creating	  a	  situation	  of	  class	  domination	  where	  “a	  certain	  stratum	  of	  social	  positions	  is	  effectively	  closed	  to	  [the	  poor].”122	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  Free	  Market	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  While	  this	  example	  may	  be	  helpful	  in	  showing	  how	  intergenerational	  transmission	  of	  advantage	  may	  occur,	  class	  domination	  is	  hardly	  limited	  to	  cases	  of	  tacit	  agreements	  between	  university	  admissions	  offices	  and	  the	  wealthy	  elite.	  Rather,	  class	  domination	  extends	  to	  all	  aspects	  of	  civil	  life,	  including	  the	  political	  arena,	  the	  workplace	  and	  interpersonal	  relationships.	  Because	  of	  its	  extensive	  scope,	  class	  domination	  threatens	  to	  impermissibly	  reduce	  individuals’	  sense	  of	  self-­‐authorship	  over	  their	  own	  lives.	  As	  Rawls	  put	  it,	  “significant	  political	  and	  economic	  inequalities	  are	  often	  associated	  with	  inequalities	  of	  social	  status	  that	  encourage	  those	  of	  lower	  status	  to	  be	  viewed	  both	  by	  themselves	  and	  by	  others	  as	  inferior”	  which	  in	  turn	  “may	  arouse	  widespread	  attitudes	  of	  deference	  and	  servility	  on	  one	  side	  and	  a	  will	  to	  dominate	  and	  arrogance	  on	  the	  other.”123	  	  Should	  class	  domination	  be	  permitted,	  as	  it	  is	  in	  market	  democratic	  societies,	  then	  the	  poor’s	  agency	  would	  be	  systematically	  restricted,	  due	  to	  their	  being	  fewer	  educational,	  political	  and	  workplace	  opportunities	  practically	  open	  to	  them.	  As	  a	  result	  of	  this	  decrease	  in	  agency,	  the	  poor	  may	  begin	  to	  loose	  their	  strong	  sense	  of	  self-­‐respect,	  which	  is	  crucial	  for	  exercising	  their	  full	  self-­‐authorship.	  In	  this	  instance,	  agency,	  self-­‐respect	  and	  self-­‐authorship	  can	  all	  be	  critically	  undermined	  by	  not	  restricting	  the	  amount	  of	  wealth	  and	  advantage	  that	  can	  be	  transmitted	  between	  generations.	  Allowing	  the	  wealthy	  elite	  to	  dominate	  over	  the	  poor	  in	  ways	  that	  can	  deprive	  the	  poor	  of	  critical	  opportunities	  for	  promoting	  their	  agency	  and	  self-­‐authorship	  is	  a	  serious	  flaw	  of	  Tomasi’s	  market	  democratic	  approach.	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   Even	  if	  it	  could	  be	  shown	  that	  having	  greater	  income	  and	  wealth	  leads	  individuals	  to	  have	  greater	  agency	  over	  their	  lives,	  and	  that	  agency	  is	  more	  essential	  for	  self-­‐authorship	  than	  is	  status,	  Tomasi’s	  market	  democracy	  may	  still	  fall	  short	  of	  Rawls’	  liberal	  alternatives	  because	  of	  his	  faulty	  assumptions	  about	  economic	  growth.	  The	  first	  assumption,	  which	  I	  have	  already	  brought	  into	  question,	  is	  that	  free	  market	  societies	  are	  more	  efficient	  than	  some	  more	  egalitarian	  societies	  at	  stimulating	  economic	  growth.	  A	  second	  assumption	  is	  that	  a	  higher	  growth	  rate	  for	  the	  overall	  economy	  will	  necessarily	  translate	  to	  a	  higher	  growth	  rate	  for	  the	  worst-­‐off	  in	  society.	  I	  will	  finish	  by	  challenging	  the	  second	  of	  these	  assumptions.	  	   5.1	  Bigger	  Pie,	  Smaller	  Slices	  A	  crucial	  flaw	  of	  Tomasi’s	  economic	  growth	  argument	  is	  that	  a	  bigger	  economic	  pie	  for	  society	  does	  not	  necessarily	  guarantee	  bigger	  slices	  for	  all.124	  For	  although	  it	  is	  the	  case	  that	  in	  Brennan’s	  table	  (see	  page	  63),	  the	  size	  of	  the	  slices	  for	  each	  economic	  class	  grows	  commensurate	  with	  the	  size	  of	  the	  economic	  pie	  as	  a	  whole,	  this	  distributional	  pattern	  need	  not	  occur.	  Indeed,	  in	  the	  market	  democratic	  structure	  that	  Tomasi	  supports,	  it	  is	  just	  as	  likely	  that	  the	  gains	  earned	  from	  market	  competition,	  and	  the	  division	  of	  labor	  would	  be	  held	  solely	  by	  the	  top	  richest	  percentile	  while	  the	  poorest	  percentile	  would	  maintain	  only	  their	  pre-­‐economic	  growth	  level	  of	  income.	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The	  image	  at	  right,	  representing	  present-­‐day	  holdings	  of	  income	  and	  wealth	  in	  America,	  comes	  worryingly	  close	  to	  illustrating	  exactly	  this	  type	  of	  inequitable	  distribution.	  Forgetting	  for	  the	  moment	  concerns	  about	  the	  relational	  status	  between	  the	  rich	  and	  the	  poor,	  if	  it	  is	  possible	  that	  not	  even	  the	  absolute	  position	  of	  the	  worst-­‐off	  will	  improve	  in	  a	  market	  democratic	  society,	  then	  there	  is	  reason	  to	  worry	  that	  market	  democracies	  will	  not	  be	  able	  to	  satisfy	  even	  Tomasi’s	  watered-­‐down	  version	  of	  the	  difference	  principle,	  which	  only	  seeks	  to	  increase	  the	  poorest’s	  holdings	  of	  income	  and	  wealth	  without	  directly	  seeking	  to	  increase	  PPO	  and	  the	  social	  bases	  of	  self-­‐respect.	  For	  this	  reason,	  Tomasi’s	  claim	  that	  market	  democracies	  will	  necessarily	  lead	  to	  the	  poorest	  having	  greater	  holdings	  of	  income	  and	  wealth	  is	  dubious.	  
6.	  Summary	  of	  Objections	  In	  this	  chapter	  I	  have	  argued	  that	  Tomasi	  wrongly	  interprets	  the	  importance	  of,	  and	  the	  relationship	  between,	  the	  three	  DP	  goods.	  He	  does	  this	  first	  by	  presuming	  that	  PPO	  and	  income	  and	  wealth	  are	  rivalrous,	  which	  is	  not	  true	  since	  property-­‐owning	  democracies	  and	  liberal	  democratic	  socialism	  show	  that	  the	  DP	  good	  of	  PPO	  can	  be	  married	  to	  the	  DP	  good	  of	  income	  and	  wealth.	  	  Second,	  he	  assumes	  that	  income	  and	  wealth	  is	  more	  important	  than	  PPO	  because	  agency	  is	  more	  important	  than	  status.	  I	  rebutted	  this	  by	  showing,	  first,	  that	  not	  everyone	  would	  agree	  that	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agency	  is	  as,	  or	  more	  important	  than,	  status	  and,	  second,	  that	  even	  if	  agency	  were	  more	  important,	  Rawls’s	  regimes	  have	  the	  same	  potential	  for	  promoting	  agency	  as	  do	  Tomasi’s	  proposed	  market	  democratic	  regimes.	  Lastly,	  I	  showed	  that	  Tomasi	  is	  mistaken	  in	  concluding	  that	  market	  democratic	  regimes	  realize	  higher	  levels	  of	  income	  and	  wealth	  for	  the	  worst	  off,	  since	  market	  democracy	  does	  not	  guarantee	  a	  higher	  absolute	  income	  for	  the	  worst-­‐off.	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Conclusion	  	   In	  this	  thesis	  I	  have	  argued	  that	  Tomasi’s	  market	  democratic	  interpretation	  of	  Rawls’	  theory	  of	  justice	  as	  fairness	  does	  not,	  as	  Tomasi	  suggests,	  fully	  resolve	  the	  dispute	  between	  high	  liberals	  and	  libertarians/classical	  liberals.	  	  Although	  Tomasi	  successfully	  demonstrates	  that	  economic	  decision-­‐making	  can	  be	  of	  extreme	  importance	  to	  some	  citizens,	  I	  argue	  that	  he	  does	  not	  prove	  that	  freedom	  of	  economic	  contract,	  and	  the	  right	  to	  own	  private	  productive	  property	  are	  basic	  in	  the	  Rawlsian	  sense.	  Rawls’	  basic	  liberties	  require	  a	  high	  standard	  of	  significance,	  i.e.	  they	  need	  to	  be	  essential	  for	  the	  full	  development	  of	  the	  moral	  powers	  of	  all	  citizens.	  I	  contend	  that	  Tomasi’s	  economic	  liberties	  do	  not	  meet	  this	  standard,	  since	  individuals	  can	  live	  full	  and	  meaningful	  lives	  without	  having	  these	  economic	  liberties	  guaranteed	  to	  them.	  Therefore,	  freedom	  of	  economic	  contract	  and	  the	  right	  to	  private	  productive	  property	  ownership	  are	  not	  basic	  liberties.	  This	  is	  not	  to	  say	  that	  the	  economic	  liberties	  should	  not	  be	  granted	  any	  significance,	  since	  it	  is	  entirely	  possible	  that	  having	  more	  extensive	  property	  rights	  and	  rights	  to	  contract	  may	  be	  important	  for	  some	  individuals	  to	  satisfy-­‐their	  third	  fundamental	  interest	  of	  following	  a	  particular	  conception	  of	  the	  good	  life.	  However,	  since	  considerations	  about	  individuals’	  third	  fundamental	  interests	  are	  not	  to	  be	  considered	  when	  picking	  out	  which	  rights	  are	  basic,	  this	  line	  of	  reasoning	  cannot	  be	  used	  to	  defend	  Tomasi’s	  claim	  that	  the	  economic	  liberties	  are	  basic.	  	   In	  addition	  to	  this	  objection,	  I	  have	  also	  raised	  the	  worry	  that	  if	  the	  economic	  liberties	  were	  made	  basic,	  then	  this	  could	  limit	  the	  effectiveness	  of	  the	  second	  principle	  of	  justice	  because	  of	  the	  priority	  relationship	  of	  the	  first	  principle	  over	  the	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second.	  Although	  I	  admitted	  that	  the	  right	  to	  own	  private	  productive	  property	  could,	  at	  least	  in	  theory,	  improve	  overall	  social	  welfare,	  I	  also	  noted	  that	  making	  freedom	  of	  economic	  contract	  a	  basic	  right	  poses	  a	  serious	  threat	  to	  legitimate	  labor	  regulations.	  This	  is	  because,	  if	  freedom	  of	  economic	  contract	  is	  granted	  basic	  status,	  then	  contracts	  negotiated	  using	  desperation	  bargaining	  could	  not	  be	  overturned	  to	  promote	  equality	  in	  bargaining	  power	  between	  the	  employing	  and	  laboring	  class.	  Following	  this	  objection,	  I	  argued	  that	  Tomasi’s	  justification	  for	  amending	  Rawls’	  difference	  principle,	  to	  aim	  primarily	  at	  increasing	  citizens’	  holdings	  of	  income	  and	  wealth,	  relied	  on	  unfounded	  assumptions.	  Against	  Tomasi’s	  first	  assumption	  -­‐	  that	  powers	  and	  prerogatives	  of	  office	  (PPO)	  are	  necessarily	  rivalrous	  with	  income	  and	  wealth	  -­‐	  I	  argued	  that	  this	  is	  simply	  not	  the	  case,	  since	  both	  of	  Rawls’	  proposed	  schemes	  (property	  owning	  democracy	  and	  liberal	  democratic	  socialism)	  can	  theoretically	  maximize	  these	  goods	  simultaneously,	  without	  needing	  to	  trade	  off	  one	  good	  for	  the	  other.	  Additionally,	  I	  argued	  that	  Tomasi’s	  second	  assumption	  -­‐	  that	  citizens	  would	  place	  greater	  significance	  on	  securing	  income	  and	  wealth,	  than	  securing	  a	  more	  democratic	  workplace	  -­‐	  was	  likewise	  misguided.	  This	  is	  because	  the	  work	  that	  people	  do	  plays	  a	  crucial	  role	  in	  their	  every	  day	  lives,	  and	  therefore	  many	  citizens	  either	  care,	  or	  should	  care,	  deeply	  about	  how	  much	  say	  they	  have	  in	  their	  workplaces.	  	  Following	  this,	  I	  showed	  that	  Tomasi’s	  claim	  that	  capitalist	  societies	  necessarily	  enhance	  citizens’	  agency	  was	  also	  highly	  controversial,	  since	  even	  at	  the	  level	  of	  ideal	  theory,	  capitalism	  allows	  for	  unemployment	  and	  no	  clear	  prohibitions	  against	  class	  domination.	  Rawlsian	  regimes,	  in	  contrast,	  seek	  full	  employment	  and	  
	   79	  
rectification	  for	  unfair	  advantages	  based	  on	  class	  and	  ability.	  The	  one	  concession	  I	  did	  grant	  Tomasi	  is	  that	  although	  the	  threat	  of	  monopolization	  is	  increased	  in	  a	  capitalist	  society,	  we	  cannot	  assume	  that	  monopolies	  will	  necessarily	  arise,	  since	  we	  must	  grant	  that	  at	  the	  level	  of	  ideal	  theory,	  markets	  will	  be	  freely	  competitive.	  Lastly,	  I	  presented	  the	  worry	  that	  even	  if	  Tomasi	  were	  right	  to	  claim	  that	  market	  democratic	  regimes	  better	  stimulate	  economic	  growth	  than	  do	  social	  democratic	  regimes,	  this	  does	  not	  necessarily	  mean	  that	  market	  democratic	  regimes	  will	  necessarily	  increase	  the	  holdings	  of	  income	  and	  wealth	  held	  by	  the	  worst-­‐off.	  Since	  it	  is	  possible	  that	  most	  of	  the	  money	  in	  a	  market-­‐democratic	  society	  will	  be	  held	  in	  the	  hands	  of	  a	  highly	  concentrated	  wealthy	  elite,	  Tomasi’s	  claim	  that	  his	  view	  better	  enhances	  the	  worst-­‐offs	  holdings	  of	  income	  and	  wealth	  is	  unconvincing.	  For	  all	  of	  the	  aforementioned	  reasons,	  Tomasi’s	  claim	  that	  his	  market	  democratic	  approach	  to	  social	  justice	  offers	  “a	  more	  robust	  and	  morally	  ambitious	  account	  of	  the	  institutions	  we	  need	  if	  we	  sincerely	  wish	  to	  respect	  our	  fellow	  citizens	  as	  free	  and	  equal	  self-­‐governing	  agents”	  is	  flawed.	  Commitment	  to	  Tomasi’s	  framework	  threatens	  citizens’	  ability	  to	  live	  as	  free	  and	  equal	  democratic	  citizens	  by	  perpetuating	  a	  system	  of	  class	  domination	  and	  harmful	  inequality.	  However,	  in	  arguing	  for	  his	  position,	  Tomasi	  has	  compelled	  high-­‐liberals	  to	  clarify	  and	  strengthen	  their	  own	  position	  on	  the	  nature	  of	  justice.	  To	  this	  extent,	  Free	  Market	  Fairness	  represents	  a	  highly	  valuable	  contribution	  to	  liberal	  political	  theory.	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